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Introduction
“The French Revolution of 1789-1814 draped itself alternately in the guise of the Roman
Republic and the Roman Empire”
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte1
“We, we want the republic, but not in the manner of the Greeks, the Romans, the Batavians, the
English, the Swiss, etc. […] The Romans never recognized any declaration of rights but the right
of the strongest [droit du plus fort]”
Issue 168 of the Révolutions de Paris, cited by Philippe Bordes2
The most widely known commentary on the relationship between the French Revolution
and Antiquity is without a doubt the famous quote by Karl Marx, according to which the
Revolution dressed itself in Roman garb. From a certain point of view, this observation is
incontestable: The Revolution sprang forth at the height of the neoclassical movement in art and
architecture; revolutionaries frequently invoked Antiquity in their speeches, journals, petitions;
sometimes they exchanged their given name for one from Antiquity, as in the case of Gracchus
Babeuf or Anacharsis Cloots. Upon the establishment of the Republic, a bust of Brutus (probably
the founder of the Republic and not the tyrannicide) was even placed in the meeting-hall of the
newly elected National Convention.
For Marx, following the early 19th century theorist Benjamin Constant and of certain
contemporaries of the Revolution who were more or less hostile to it, such as the historians
Volney and Levesque or the émigré author Chateaubriand, this taste for Antiquity reveals a desire

1

Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852), Part 1,
<http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm>.
2
Philippe Bordes, La mort de Brutus de Pierre-Narcisse Guérin, (Vizille: Musée de la Révolution française, 1996),
pp. 60, 87 (n. 75). All translations from French are mine unless otherwise specified.
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to imitate it. From the time of these early commentaries on, few historians have closely examined
this analysis. Yet one can observe sentiments rejecting classicism among French revolutionaries
as well. Even as they “draped” themselves in Antique garb, many revolutionaries doubted that
Antiquity could be considered a model of perfection, as art historian Philippe Bordes’ citation of
the patriot3 journal the Révolutions de Paris illustrates.
I first read this quote, which forms part of this introduction’s epigraph, in Bordes’ history
of the revolutionary painting competition of 1793, and as I have since learned, it is drawn from a
far more elaborate argument. In this argument, the journal explains that Revolutionary France had
surpassed and should continue to surpass all existing models, including those of Ancient Greece
and Rome, through its adherence to the philosophy of natural rights enshrined in the Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen. I was immediately struck by the contrast between this rejection
of the model of Antiquity by a revolutionary journal and Marx’s assertion that the imitation of
Antiquity was fundamental to the Revolution.
The two opposing visions of the Revolution that these quotes projected made me wonder
which of these Revolutions, the classicizing Revolution or the Revolution that rejected Antiquity
as a model most closely resembled the reality of the Revolution, or whether the two could
coexist. Then, if the two visions of the Revolution could coexist, if the Revolution could have
been at once immersed in a classicizing culture and potentially reject Antiquity as a model to
3

I use the term “patriot” instead of the term “radical,” employed by many Anglophone historians, like Jack Censer,
author of a study on what he terms the “radical” press from 1789 to 1791, advisedly. “Patriot” (or “patriote”) is the
term by which the partisans of the Declaration of Rights and of popular sovereignty designated themselves, in
opposition to “aristocrats” (not to be confused with the “nobility,” which designates those belonging to a particular
caste rather than a political tendency) or “counterrevolutionaries.” It is important not to stray too far from the terms
of the period, especially in examining the ideas and mentalities of revolutionary actors, in order not to lose sight of
the mental universe in which they operated. Moreover, imposing a term such as “radical,” a designation which was
applied to Englishmen with similar ideas in this period, seems to indicate a desire to fit the concepts, events, and
actors of the French Revolution into a foreign mold. Like Robert Darnton’s use of the term “Grub Street,” also cited
by Censer, to designate the culture of the clandestine press of the last years of the Ancien Régime, this kind of choice
imposes an Anglo-centric point of view without cause. It should go without saying that the choice of terminology
does not imply a lack of critical analysis in the use of any terms appearing in this study. Jack Richard Censer,
Prelude to Power: The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976).
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imitate, what did it mean for revolutionaries to reference Antiquity? This thesis is an attempt to
begin to answer these questions and others that the juxtaposition between these two quotes first
raised for me.
Since the quote that first made me want to investigate the nature of the reference to
Antiquity during the French Revolution comes from the journal the Révolutions de Paris, it
seemed logical to begin my inquiry by analyzing the classical allusions from that journal. This
thesis is not concerned with artistic representations of Antiquity, nor of classicizing cultural
trends more generally, though both are fundamental to the broader understanding of the
relationship between the Revolution and Antiquity. Rather, I focus on textual analysis. One
reason for this choice, and not the least important, is simply that this line of inquiry has been
explored less thoroughly than that of neoclassical art or classicizing nomenclature. On a more
fundamental level, textual analysis allows for the study not only of the use of classical references
itself, but also of how revolutionaries themselves understood this phenomenon, for they
occasionally commented on it themselves. Only textual sources can allow us to see what the
revolutionaries themselves believed they were accomplishing by invoking Antiquity.
The citation from the Révolutions de Paris by which this thesis begins comes from the
first issue of the journal to be published after the declaration of the first French Republic, which
is to say the issue covering the week of 22-29 September 1792. As such, it marks not only a new
beginning, but also the end point of the processes that had brought about the Republic. This thesis
backtracks slightly more than one year from that point, in order to examine the references to
Antiquity that this journal made during the events following the king’s flight in the summer of
1791, here termed the Varennes Crisis, the moment to which historians like Timothy Tackett and
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Raymonde Monnier date the fatal de-legitimization of the monarchy and the development and
spread of the republican movement.4
While the journal had not yet arrived at the kind of clear articulation of what the French
Revolution could and could not learn from Antiquity that can be found in the later article, it is
already possible to recognize that the journal’s classical references were not made in a spirit of
imitation during this period. Rather, they contributed to the advancement of the process of delegitimizing the constitutional monarchy and the spread of republicanism in public opinion, by
allowing the journal to ground otherwise unsettlingly new ideas in a shared classical culture, the
meanings of which enjoyed a broad consensus.
This thesis fits into a number of different historiographies. First, of course, it adds its
analyses to those of the small number of historians of the French Revolution or of Antiquity who
have investigated the relationship between the two. Among these studies, the most important in
French or English are the American historian Harold T. Parker’s monograph, The Cult of
Antiquity and the French Revolution, which has understandably aged somewhat since its
publication in 1937; the book drawn from Jacques Bouineau’s doctoral thesis, published in 1982,
Les Toges du Pouvoir, ou la Révolution de droit antique: 1789-1799, the principal merit of which
is to have undertaken a systematic analysis of classical references in revolutionary discourse by
organizing all those recorded in the thirty thousand pages of the Moniteur universel into
statistical tables; finally the synthesis written for the bicentennial of the Revolution in 1989 for a

4

Despite their agreement on this point, it should be noted that the two historians take very different approaches, as R.
Monnier herself notes. T. Tackett’s analysis privileges what he sees as the foreshadowing of the repression of 179394 commonly termed the “Terror” – a term both loaded and imprecise which should be used with circumspection –
even as it uncovers how for the first time the idea of abolishing the monarchy began to enjoy wide popular support
following the king’s flight. R. Monnier’s study focuses on the burgeoning republican movement and its philosophical
roots. Raymonde Monnier, Républicanisme, Patriotisme et Révolution française, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005). (See p.
27 for Monnier’s discussion of the differences between her approach and that of T. Tackett.) Timothy Tackett, When
the King Took Flight, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
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popular audience, La Révolution française et l’antiquité, by Claude Mossé, historian of Ancient
Greece.5
In addition to these books a number of articles and book chapters have been written,
mostly in the past twenty to thirty years, tackling different aspects of the relationship between the
Revolution and Antiquity.6 Among these François Hartog and Pierre Vidal-Nacquet and Nicole
Loraux’s essays are particularly noteworthy for having interrogated this relationship within the
framework of historical memory. Hartog and Vidal-Nacquet’s work is especially interesting in
that it situates the recent historiography of the relationship between the French Revolution and
Antiquity, and even of the French Revolution in general, within the context of older
commentaries on this phenomenon that go back to the Revolution itself.7
It is important to understand the principal evolution of these commentaries, though it is
impossible to present all their complications in detail, since they are at the origin of the
historiography of the relationship between the Revolution and Antiquity. Perhaps even more
importantly, the two rival schools, the “Marxists” and the “Revisionists,” can trace their origins
back to these commentaries as well. Since the former dominated the historiography for the better

5

Harold T. Parker, The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A Study in the Development of the
Revolutionary Spirit, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1937); Jacques Bouineau, Les Toges du Pouvoir ou la
Révolution de droit antique, 1789-1799, (Toulouse: Association des Publications de l’Université de Toulouse-le
Mirail & Éditions Eché, 1986); Claude Mossé, L’Antiquité dans la Révolution française, (Paris: Éditions Albin
Michel, 1989).
6
J. Bouineau, “Caton révolutionnaire: de l’imaginaire social comme genèse de la construction juridique,” in
Mélanges G. Boulvert, (Nice: 1987); M.-T. Bouyssy, “L’Antiquité ténaréenne de Barère” in Dix-huitième siècle, 27
“L’Antiquité” (1995), pp. 259-68; M. Rosso, “Les réminiscences spartiates dans les discours et la politique de
Robespierre de 1789 à Thermidor,” Annales historiques de la Révolution française. 349 | July-September 2007, pp.
51-77.
7
François Hartog, Anciens, modernes, sauvages, (Paris: Galaade Éditions, 2005), especially ch. 2, “La dernière
Querelle : Révolution et illusion,” pp. 55-95, and Régimes d’historicité: Présentisme et expériences du temps,
(Éditions du Seuil, 2003); Pierre Vidal-Nacquet and Nicole Loraux, “La formation de l’Athènes bourgeoise: essai
d’historiographie 1750-1850” and Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, “La Place de la Grèce dans l’imaginaire des hommes de la
Révolution” in Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, La Démocratie grecque vue d’ailleurs, Essais d’historiographie ancienne et
moderne, (Flammarion, 1990).
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part of the last century, and the latter continues to dominate in some cases, it is all the more
crucial to understand these foundational texts.
At the time of the Revolution, or more precisely after 9 Thermidor, which for many
historians marks the end of the forward progression of the Revolution, writers hostile to the
Revolution’s democratic ideals such as Chateaubriand, Levesque and Volney condemned the
preceding period for what they described as the revolutionaries’ desire to imitate Antiquity. They
decried the democratic “anarchy” characteristic of the period of revolutionary government which
had just been brought to an end, which resulted, they affirmed, from this imitation of Antiquity.
These authors ridiculed the revolutionaries for their alleged failure to understand that the
democracy of “ancient republics” had depended upon slavery, that the “citizens” of Athens,
Sparta or Rome corresponded more closely to the former aristocrats than to the French people.
Only the revolutionaries’ own ignorance could have persuaded them that full citizenship could
apply to all classes of society. Finally, they concluded that democracy and its foundations in
natural rights philosophy were neither possible nor desirable in the contemporary world.
At the beginning of the Bourbon Restoration, first in 1814 and then in 1819, the theorist
Benjamin Constant reprised certain aspects of this Thermidorian critique of the revolutionary
reference to Antiquity, modifying it to suit his purposes. Where Volney in particular had rejected
any notion of rights, which he identified exclusively with the philosophy of natural rights as
expressed in the Declarations of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and 1793, Constant
adopted another Thermidorian idea, that of the rights of man “in society.”
During the Revolution, patriots, or partisans of natural rights, believed that rights were
individual and collective, personal and political, innate to every human being and inalienable.
Not only did they see no contradiction between individual and collective rights or civil and
political rights, they believed you could not have one without the other. Drawing on John Locke’s
9

version of social contract theory, they believed that the rights “of man” had already belonged to
humanity in the state of nature, but persisted in the state of society, where they became
inextricably linked with the rights “of the citizen” which guaranteed them.
When the Thermidorian Convention drafted the Constitution of the Year III which formed
the Directory, it rejected this philosophy of natural rights in favor of the “rights of man in
society.” As the name implies, these “rights” are neither innate nor inalienable: they are whatever
a given society decides. The Thermidorian Convention decided, when declaring the rights of man
in society, that there would be a separation between political and civil rights and that the first
would no longer be attached to each individual by virtue of his humanity, but rather to wealth.8
This is the separation that Constant adopts. For him political rights constitute the “liberty
of the Ancients,” civil rights the “liberty of the Moderns.” He even went further, positing the
incompatibility between these two kinds of liberty. According to Constant, with the liberty of the
Ancients the individual sacrifices his civil rights to the collectivity in exchange for his right to
political participation, while with the liberty of the Moderns, the collectivity sacrifices its
political rights to a propertied élite on the condition that this élite guarantee the rights of the
individual. Drawing on Volney and Levesque’s thesis that the patriots of the Revolution did not
understand that democracy is only possibly alongside slavery, he agreed that political
participation should remain the prerogative of a propertied élite.
However, Constant does not deny that the political participation of all citizens had been
admirable in Antiquity. This is why he calls this the “liberty” of the Ancients. He even appears
nostalgic for its attractions, but remains convinced that the only rights that can apply to everyone,
since those who would have been slaves in Antiquity had joined the ranks of citizens, are civil

8

See Florence Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution, 1789-1795-1802, (Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1992).
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rights, or the “liberty of the Moderns.” For Constant the revolutionaries’ error was one of
anachronism. They chose to imitate the Ancients instead of striving to be modern, and the
inevitable result was anarchy.
When Marx sought to understand the relationship between the French Revolution and
Antiquity a generation later, Constant’s separation between the “liberty of the Ancients” and the
“liberty of the Moderns” had enjoyed such great success that the revolutionary theory of natural
rights had been utterly forgotten. Thus, without sharing Constant’s agenda, Marx nevertheless
reprised his dichotomy, which he then also projected back onto the Revolution. At the same time,
it did not escape him that if one had to fit the Declaration of Rights into this dichotomy, the
guarantee of the rights of the individual inscribed there would fit more closely with the “liberty of
the Moderns” than with the “liberty of the Ancients.” This observation, when taken together with
his more famous one that the bourgeoisie as a class had emerged as the “victor” of the
Revolution, led him to conclude that the revolutionaries had been, volens nolens, the objective
allies of “liberals” like Constant. This conclusion would be the basis of the theory adopted by
Marxist historians in the 20th century of the French Revolution as a “bourgeois revolution.”
In the meanwhile, as noted above, Marx himself was not unaware of the prevalence of the
reference to Antiquity during the Revolution. In order to explain it, he too reprised the thesis that
revolutionaries thoughtlessly attempted to imitate Antiquity without understanding their own
historical moment. In short, the revolutionaries had tried to be Ancients, failing to understand that
they could only be Moderns. Thus, Marx, like Constant, accepted the inevitability of the advent
of the liberal bourgeois order, even as he rejected his predecessor’s belief in its desirability and
confidence in its durability. Despite all their differences, “revisionist” and “Marxist” historians
continue to share, in its broad outlines, this idea of the bourgeois revolution, which ultimately

11

rests on the thesis that the revolutionaries misunderstood both their own historical moment and
the ancient models they were attempting to emulate.
In the last twenty-five years or so certain historians of natural rights or republicanism like
Florence Gauthier, Marc Belissa, Yannick Bosc and Raymonde Monnier, along with historians of
revolutionary mentalities like Timothy Tackett or Sophie Wahnich, have begun to question the
notion of the bourgeois revolution, whether it be the “good” revolution of the revisionists or the
inevitable historical phase of the Marxists.9 For this historiographical current, if one wants to
understand the French Revolution, it is indispensable to take revolutionary discourse and the
ideas behind it seriously. In doing so, these historians have begun to discover the multiplicity of
revolutionary thought, the various facets of which were continually in dialogue with each other.
At its heart they have discovered a synthesis between the traditions of classical republicanism and
natural rights and the lived experience of the Revolution.
This thesis fits above all into this historiography. At the critical juncture of the Varennes
Crisis, the king’s flight put the entire edifice of the constitutional monarchy into question. A
prominent patriot journal like the Révolutions de Paris could ill afford, in that moment, to
thoughtlessly invoke Antiquity as a simple model to be imitated. Rather, the journal seized the
opportunity to use its powers of persuasion in favor of a republican alternative to the corrupted
constitution of 1791. In this context, the reference to Antiquity is most often used to legitimize its

9

See Florence Gauthier, Triomphe et mort du droit naturel en Révolution, 1789-1795-1802, (Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1992); Marc Belissa, Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713-1795), Les
cosmopolitiques du droit des gens, (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1998); Yannick Bosc, “1789-1793-1795 : Déclaration,
Constitution et terreur de la Déclaration,” in Serge Bianchi and Philippe Bourdin, eds., Révoltes et révolutions de
1773 à 1802, Europe, Russie, Amériques, (Nantes: Éditions du temps, 2004), p. 192-208; Marc Belissa, Yannick
Bosc, and Florence Gauthier, eds., Républicanismes et droit naturel. Des humanistes au Révolutions des droits de
l’homme et du citoyen, (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2009); Raymonde Monnier, Républicanisme, Patriotisme et Révolution
française, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005); Timothy Tackett, When the King Took Flight, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2003); Sophie Wahnich, La longue patience du peuple, 1792, (Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages,
2008).
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contributors’ own ideas, which were well anchored not only in contemporary politics but also in
the theories of natural rights and republicanism developed over the course of centuries.
Since the concept of the republic first emerged in Antiquity, it is no surprise that classical
references would be used to legitimize republicanism. The connection between references to
Antiquity and natural rights, on the other hand, is indirect. Yet this does not make the latter any
less important to understanding the former. The Révolutions de Paris used classical references to
lend weight to their attacks on the monarchy or their arguments in favor of republicanism.
However, the journal’s primary reason for suggesting that the time had come to replace the
monarchy with a republic was always that the king and the constitution of 1791 flouted the
people’s natural rights and that a republic would better protect them. The revolutionary synthesis
of ideas had created a new, hybrid entity and called it by the old name of republic. Certain
attributes of this republic, like its necessary civic virtue, went back to Antiquity, allowing its
partisans to claim this legitimizing filiation, but its raison d’être was natural rights.
In order to give the reader an idea of the contours of the phenomenon of the journalistic
reference to Antiquity during the Varennes Crisis studied here, this thesis will begin by
contextualizing the Révolutions de Paris and the role of the press and of this journal in particular
in the antimonarchical and republican movement that developed following the king’s flight. The
first chapter will then continue with a discussion of methodology and a statistical analysis of all
the classical references made by the Révolutions de Paris in the course of the summer of 1791.
This analysis will create an overview of the data and give the reader as complete an idea as
possible of the kinds of references being made and their relative frequency.
The following two chapters will present a qualitative and contextualized analysis of these
references. Classical references in the Révolutions de Paris during the Varennes Crisis fall into
two principal categories: broadly, those used against the monarchy and those used in favor of
13

republicanism. Chapter two will then first examine how this journal used references to Antiquity
to de-legitimize the constitutional monarchy, or rather to put its self-inflicted loss of legitimacy
on display. Chapter three will follow with the analysis of the use of classical references to
legitimize republicanism, both as a regime without a king and as the kind of “free state” theorized
by classical republican thought and adapted by patriots in light of natural rights philosophy and
the events of the Revolution.
Finally, this thesis will conclude by returning to the article from the issue of the
Révolutions de Paris announcing the advent of the Republic, cited at the beginning of this
introduction, in order to reflect, in light of the analyses made in the body of this thesis, on the
implications of classical references for the study of political ideas and discourse during the
French Revolution more generally.

14

Chapter One
I.

The Journal the Révolutions de Paris and its Contributors

This thesis focuses on classical references made in one of the most influential and longpublished patriot journals, Prudhomme’s Révolutions de Paris, at a decisive moment of the
French Revolution, the summer of 1791, from the king’s flight to the end of the National
Constituent Assembly. More precisely, this thesis will look at issues 100-118 (4 June-15 October
1791), which is to say from two issues before the king’s flight (21 June 1791) to two issues after
the end of the Constituent Assembly (the end of September 1791), in order to better situate the
period under examination. As the historians Timothy Tackett and Raymonde Monnier, among
others, have demonstrated, though the fall of the monarchy would ultimately have to wait another
year, its fall in the eyes of public opinion and the rise of republicanism can be dated to this
period. I propose to analyze the role of references to Greco-Roman Antiquity in this process.
Though historians disagree about the extent of its influence, the press undeniably played an
important role in shaping as well as reflecting public opinion. Therefore, before plunging into the
vicissitudes of this turbulent period, it is essential to take a closer look at our principal primary
source, the Révolutions de Paris and the role it played in a larger press culture.
The Révolutions de Paris was founded by the bookseller and pamphleteer Prudhomme in
the summer of 1789, one of many new titles that appeared with the Revolution and its newfound
freedom of the press. Like so many other rights, this freedom of the press was conquered by the
Revolution and not offered by the king. The king had called for his subjects to present their
grievances when he convoked the Estates-General, but the response he received quickly
outstripped his expectations. From the opening of the Estates-General, his council reminded the
public of the prohibition to publish without official permission, but journalists and pamphleteers
15

ignored the admonition. On 20 June 1789, the Third Estate, along with a certain number of
deputies of the clergy and nobility, constituted itself into the National Assembly, known as the
Constituent Assembly because of its mission to provide France with a constitution. A month
later, 26 August 1789, the Constituent Assembly decreed the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and Citizen, which consecrated freedom of the press among the most fundamental of these rights.
However, the Assembly soon came to realize what had been clear to the royalist journalist
Rivarol from the first: rights would not remain the prerogative of the largely bourgeois élite from
which the Assembly was drawn, but that now, “The negroes in our colonies and the domestics in
our houses can, Declaration of Rights in hand, dispossess us of our inheritances.”1 Horrified at
the idea that the rights they had just declared might also apply to peasants and artisans, let alone
servants and slaves, the more conservative elements of the Assembly emigrated, openly joining
the counterrevolution. Among those who stayed, a large contingent worked tirelessly to
“moderate” the effects of the Declaration, if not to have it rescinded altogether.
Attempts to limit freedom of the press, on the part of these “moderates” from the
Assembly or of departmental or municipal governments, nevertheless remained more or less
ineffectual against the onslaught of publications, at least until the last months of the Constituent
Assembly (July-September 1791), a period characterized by reactionary repression and which
saw several of the most prominent “patriot” journals shut down. Even then, once the Constituent
Assembly’s successor, the Legislative Assembly effectively ended this period of repression by
declaring a general amnesty on 14 September 1791, further attempts to curb press freedom had
little effect until the fall of the monarchy 10 August 1792 and the repression of royalist journals.

1

Rivarol, “Journal politique national, ” n° 19, 1789, cited in Yannick Bosc and Sophie Wahnich, Les voix de la
Révolution, Projets pour la démocratie, (Paris: La documentation française, 1990), pp. 25-26.
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In the absence of effective repression, more than 250 new journals appeared in 1789,
followed by another 400 in 1790.2 Most of these publications were ephemeral, simple pamphlets
or periodicals that ceased publication within a matter of weeks or months. Notwithstanding, in
the average month, the Parisian could choose between 33 dailies, 12 bi- or tri-weeklies, 19
weeklies, and 14 journals whose publication was more sporadic, without forgetting the provincial
journals, which had similarly multiplied during this period. At the moment of the king’s flight in
July 1791, the numbers were even higher: 45 dailies, 27 bi- or tri-weeklies, 31 weeklies and 17
more sporadically published journals.3
Of all these journals, the Révolutions de Paris is among the best suited for a study of the
role of classical allusions in Varennes Crisis. As one of the first patriot journals to advocate a
republic, Révolutions de Paris is an ideal for examining the role of these references in the spread
of republicanism in particular. Moreover, since this journal was published without interruption
during the summer of 1791, it allows for the analysis of any possible evolution of these
references in conjunction with that of antimonarchist and republican ideas. Due to the repression
of the summer of 1791, the Révolutions de Paris is one of the few patriot journals for which this
is the case. Finally, the Révolutions de Paris was by all accounts a highly successful publication.
Camille Desmoulins even declared in his own journal that the Révolutions de Paris had as many
as 200,000 subscribers, though one should note that he was inclined to hyperbole.4 Every
parameter bears witness to it, from competitors’ borrowing of similar titles to references in other

2

Éric Wauters, “La naissance d’un ‘quatrième pouvoir’?” in Michel Biard, ed., La Révolution française, Une histoire
toujours vivante (Tallandier: 2009), p. 110.
3
Jack Richard Censer, Prelude to Power: The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791, (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1976).
4
Privately, Desmoulins expressed surprise at the prodigious success of his own journal, the Révolutions de France et
de Brabant, in a letter to his father dated 31 December 1789, when he had less than 3,000 subscribers. Pierre Rétat,
Les Journaux de 1789: Bibliographie critique, (Paris: Editions du Centre nationale de la recherche scientifique
(CNRS), 1988), p. 230.
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journals to large number of copies preserved today in libraries to its long survival compared with
its rivals.5 Its influence on public opinion was undoubtedly correspondingly important.
No single journal can, of course, encompass the entirety of patriot thought, which was
always diverse. As influential as it may have been in revolutionary public space, the Révolutions
de Paris does not, then, represent patriot thought as a whole. Moreover, the Révolutions de Paris
is not strictly comparable to any other patriot journal, but combined the models of its rivals.
Camille Desmoulins’ Révolutions de France et de Brabant, Marat’s Ami du peuple or Brissot’s
Patriote françois were, like so many journals of every leaning at the time, vehicles for the
opinions of a single author, while a competitor like the Mercure national had a number of
contributors and was largely an informational journal, specializing in foreign affairs. The
Révolutions de Paris adopted elements of each.
Contrary to most of the journaux à l’opinion, the Révolutions de Paris aimed to inform its
readers as much as to persuade them, but unlike the Mercure national, it attempted to create the
illusion of a single voice, never specifying its collaborators. Its editor, Louis-Marie Prudhomme,
stamped each issue with his seal, which bore the motto: “Prudhomme, sole author and owner of
the Révolutions de Paris.” Historian Pierre Rétat provides two possible explanations for this
choice, one relating to Prudhomme’s business model, the other to the effectiveness of the
journal’s rhetoric. The first is quite simply that Prudhomme was seeking to keep control of the
journal’s profits and avoid another lawsuit like that which his first primary contributor, Tournon,
brought against him over the rights to the first issue. 6 The second is that by maintaining the
illusion of a single voice, the journal’s discourse could become greater than the sum of its parts.
5

P. Rétat, op. cit., p. 232.
Tournon, granted equal rights to publish a journal under the name Révolutions de Paris, left Prudhomme’s
Révolutions de Paris to continue under his own banner, before briefly collaborating with Louise and François Robert
at the Mercure national in August 1790. Raymonde Monnier, Républicanisme, Patriotisme et Révolution française,
op. cit.. p. 158.
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Rétat plausibly argues that the single voice that the Révolutions de Paris adopted was not a
personalized voice like that of Desmoulins or Brissot, but rather that, unmoored from any notion
of individual authorship, it could become the voice of the Revolution itself. The journal’s ability,
noted by J. R. Censer, to support the claims of this impersonal, imperative voice of principle with
carefully reasoned argument may explain its immense success.7
However it is well known through Prudhomme’s own later acknowledgments, as well as
mentions in other journals, letters, and in certain cases ulterior republications of certain articles,
that a number of different journalists collaborated on the Révolutions de Paris. These included
first Élisée Loustalot, until his untimely death on 19 September 1790, then Fabre d’Églantine,
who, according to his biographer Louis Jacob, was with the journal only briefly at the end of
1790;8 Sylvain Maréchal,9 doubtless the most important contributor, to whom the most articles,
and the anti-clerical articles in particular, can be attributed; Léger-Félicité Sonthonax10 (until 25
July 1791) and Anaxagoras Chaumette11 who probably authored most of the articles on the
colonies; finally, François Robert, obliged to join the editorial team after the financial failure of
7

Pierre Rétat, “Forme et discours d’un journal révolutionnaire: Les Révolutions de Paris en 1789,” in Claude
Labrosse, Pierre Rétat and Henri Duranton, L’instrument périodique : La fonction de la presse au XVIIIe siècle.
(Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1985), pp. 151, 173; J. R. Censer, op. cit., pp. 22-25.
8
Louis Jacob, Fabre d’Églantine, chef des “fripons,” (Librairie Hachette, 1946), p. 78.
9
Sylvain Maréchal is the one among all the contributors to the Révolutions de Paris to whom the most articles are
attributed, and he stayed with the journal from the death of Loustalot until long after the period of the Varennes
Crisis. Having joined the editorial staff of the Révolutions de Paris in October 1790, Maréchal used the journal to
pursue his anticlerical campaign as well as opining against the king and the royal family and in favor of tyrannicide.
He also intervened in the debates on education and against feminist claims, contrary to his ideal of a patriarchal
society of modest property owning families, each headed by a strong father figure. See Françoise Aubert, Sylvain
Maréchal, Passion et faillite d’un égalitaire, (Pise: Goliardica, 1975), esp. pp. 9-17.
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Sonthonax is best known for his later role in the abolition of slavery in the French colony of Saint-Domingue,
modern Haiti. See Robert Louis Stein, Léger Félicité Sonthonax: The Lost Sentinel of the Republic, (Cranbury, NJ:
Associated University Presses, 1985).
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Chaumette’s autobiographical notes diverge from the Prudhomme’s post-Thermidorian testimony, concerning the
date at which Chaumette was hired as a journalist at the Révolutions de Paris. Nicole Bossut, a biographer of
Chaumette, makes a convincing argument for Chaumette’s own version, according to which he began to write for the
journal in December 1790. In any case, it is clear that he was already writing for the journal during the period that
concerns us here. Bossut attributes several articles from the summer of 1791 to Chaumette, including some which
may have been collaborations between him and François Robert. If Bossut is correct, then he was the author, or at
least the co-author of the account of the Champ de Mars massacre and the repression which followed. Nicole Bossut,
Chaumette, porte-parole des sans-culottes, (Paris: Éditions du CTHS, 1998), pp. 55-58, 63-64, 92-101, 108.
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the Mercure national, on which he had collaborated with his wife and founder of the journal,
Louise Kéralio, among others.12
Biographical information about these contributors can help to contextualize the journal
and the milieu that produced it. However, while historians may know the principal journalists,
more often than not it is impossible to discover the author of any given article. Thus, this thesis is
generally obliged to surrender to the fiction of the single voice, if not to the implication that this
voice embodies the principles of the Revolution. While the journal encourages by maintaining a
distinctive but uniform style from article to article, it should be noted that the discourse of the
Révolutions de Paris is not always as uniform as the style, or as historians like Censer, would
have us believe. From one issue to the next, if not necessarily from article to article, one can
sometimes see differences of opinion on all manner of subjects. Although none have turned out to
be pertinent to this thesis, it is important always to keep in mind that the Révolutions de Paris did
not issue from a single pen, even when one is forced to speak of the journal as a single entity.
In order to understand more fully how the Révolutions de Paris operated, a brief overview
of the journal’s form and content is in order. The Révolutions de Paris was one of the few
journals started at the beginning of the Revolution to last into the period of the revolutionary
government.13 Launched 18 July 1789, in the form of a pamphlet describing the events
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Raymonde Monnier, Républicanisme, Patriotisme et Révolution française, (Harmattan, 2005), p. 159. J. R. Censer
also mentions a P. J. F. Robut, about whom he claims he was able to find no information. This “Robut” is doubtless
François Robert, whose given names were, in fact, Pierre-François-Joseph.
13
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surrounding the storming of the Bastille, the first “issue” gave no indication of any intention to
make it the starting point for a periodical. However, following a rapid succession of new editions
in relatively little time, one of the journal’s co-founders had the idea to extend it into a weekly
publication.14 The Révolutions de Paris would conserve this periodicity until its last issue in
February 1794.
From the fifth issue on, the Révolutions de Paris adopted roughly the same format it
would keep until its demise. Each issue begins with several articles on the subject of the events
judged important or deserving of reflection, which the journal proceeds to comment upon at
length, particularly as regards their relation to the principles of the Declaration of Rights and
popular sovereignty. Then, in most issues, several sections deal with the faits divers of the
Revolution; sometimes there are sections treating foreign or departmental affairs, especially
while the Mercure national, for which this was a particular specialty, was still in publication;
sometimes there are letters to the editor or reviews of new books or plays, or even analysis of
official correspondence (that of the assembly or the king and his ministers) or petitions. Finally,
each issue ends with a section entitled “NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,” consisting of a summary
chronicle of the motions and decrees of the assembly, lacking in any kind of commentary.

II.

Classical Allusions in Issues 100-118 (4 June-15 October 1791) of the Révolutions
de Paris.
In order to get an idea of the kinds of classical references in the Révolutions de Paris

during the summer of 1791 and their importance, it is important to start with a general overview
of the data. Only once the reader understands the categories to which the references belonged and
14
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in what kinds of situations they were used will it be possible to examine them in the context of
specific arguments. Then, in the chapters that follow, this contextualized analysis will suggest
the ways in which they contributed to the de-legitimization of the monarchy and its partisans as
well as to the promotion of republicanism.
First, a note on methodology, in order to shed some light from the beginning on the
particular difficulties involved in a study of this nature. This thesis, following the example of
Jacques Bouineau’s thèse d’état, looks at a single source in order to find every classical allusion
made over a certain period. This process presented a number of problems. First, it is not always
possible to come up with a universal definition of what constitutes a single allusion, since they
are often divisible and belong to multiple categories. The phrase “Roman senators under the reign
of Claudius” alone contains up to three allusions, referring to the institution of the Senate, to
Ancient Rome, and to the emperor Claudius, and could be considered a single reference, a double
reference to Claudius and to the “Roman senate,” or three separate references.15 Because all three
components are necessary to comprehend the full meaning of the phrase, it seems best, for a
contextualized analysis, to understand it as a single reference. However, for the purposes of
statistical analysis, conserving complex allusions in all their specificity would make it difficult to
see larger patterns in the kind of allusions being made. Therefore, for the quantification necessary
to provide a general overview of the data, allusions such as this one will be divided into their
primary components, while in the chapters that follow, they will be examined as a whole and in
their proper context.
Another methodological problem consists in determining what constituted a classical
reference. Unlike Bouineau, this thesis is only concerned with Greco-Roman allusions, excluding
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references to other ancient civilizations as well as biblical citations.16 References to other ancient
civilizations will not be considered here for the simple reason that, aside from a very small
number of allusions to Gaul or to the Franks, which, as they are used by the Révolutions de Paris,
can be better understood as references to French history than as classical references, there are
none to be found in this data.17
Similarly, biblical allusions tend to spring from a separate phenomenon from classical
references. Because they form the basis of a still-widespread religious belief as well as the
institution of the Catholic Church, references to the Bible remain imbued with a sacred character
that classical allusions lack. This sacred character affected the ways in which even those who had
ceased to believe in Church teachings, like the contributors to the Révolutions de Paris, used
these references. Moreover, because the Church still professed to follow the teachings of the
Bible, a more direct parallel could be made between them and current Church practice than
between Greco-Roman and secular French institutions.
The data collected here differ in yet another particular from Bouineau’s, in that they are
not confined to explicit references. An allusion which invokes Horace by name is, of course,
always an allusion to Horace, but a citation of Horace which does not name him as its author will
be considered one as well. This study will also include references to post-classical works when
they refer in some way to Antiquity, such as Voltaire’s “Brutus” or a citation from Montesquieu
on Athens.
Finally, doubtless the most complicated problem with this kind of inquiry is the evolution
of various concepts and the vocabulary used to express them over the course of history. Some of
16

The partial citation of the famous New Testament injunction to “Render unto Caesar” is treated as an exception to
this rule, because of the potential duality of the reference as it is used here.
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Philip of Macedon are considered to belong to Roman and Greek history, respectively, and will be classified
accordingly. See Bouineau, Les Toges du Pouvoir, op. cit., Appendix 15, p. 497.
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these concepts, like “tyrant/tyranny,” or “republic,” originated in Antiquity, but evolved to such
an extent between that time and the end of the 18th century that in most cases the use of these
terms no longer qualifies as a classical allusion. This problem is amplified by the fact that French,
as a Romance language, derives most of its vocabulary from Latin and one must be careful not to
confuse distant echoes of the Roman past with deliberate allusions: the phrase “père de famille,”
for example, is very rarely a reference to the Roman paterfamilias, and in general usage does not
have the same connotations. What is more, during this period a large number of Latin and
especially Greek words entered everyday vocabulary for the first time, to such a remarkable
extent that a songbook of the Year VIII (1797-98) commented that “these days, in order to hear
and understand French correctly, it is Greek that one must learn.”18 Some of these words have
fallen out of general usage and remain strange to us, such as “myriagram,”19 but others, like
“meter” or “oxygen” have become so banal for us that it requires some effort to properly
recognize their novelty for the French revolutionaries. It is important therefore to always be
attentive to potential changes in meaning. The referents “dictator/dictatorship,” for example,
always refer to the Roman magistracy. Thus, in order to correctly understand a reference
denouncing dictatorship, one should think Sulla rather than Stalin. Moreover, even if dictatorship
had already acquired a largely negative connotation, a number of Roman dictators, such as
Cincinnatus, were widely admired. This thesis will attempt to guard, therefore, against
anachronistic readings.

18

Cited in Bouineau, Toges du Pouvoir, op. cit., p. 50. Here is the entire stanza: “Myriagramme, Panthéon, / Mètre,
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Conversely, certain references which may seem classical at first glance should not in fact
be counted. It is not always easy to distinguish between genuine and false references, and certain
categorizations will necessarily be debatable, but as a general rule, if it is not the journalist who is
making the allusion, it will not be counted. Did a massacre take place on the Champ de Mars?
Did the king attend a performance of the opera “Castor et Pollux”? The statistical tables
presented here will not take either into account. The name of the Champ de Mars certainly refers
to the Roman campus martius, as the story of “Castor et Pollux” has its origins in Greek
mythology, but the journalist had no choice but to use those terms in order to convey what took
place; they are not his terms.
Now, referents such as “senate/senators” or “areopagus” complicate this model.
According to the above rule, mentions of the Venetian or American senates cannot be counted,
while direct allusions to the Roman senate or the Athenian areopagus must be. So far, so simple,
but what to do with the numerous instances where the French National Assembly is referred to by
the terms “senate” or “areopagus”? Already in 1762, according to the fourth edition of the
dictionary of the Académie française, which dates from that year, “areopagus” could be used
figuratively to designate “an assembly of Judges, of Magistrates, of Statesmen.” This figurative
usage is even older for the term “senate”; the first edition of the dictionary of the Académie
française (1694) already explained that “Orators and Poets sometimes call the Parlements and
other superior companies of the Kingdom by the name of Senate.”20 Due to this longstanding
figurative usage, this kind of reference will not be included in the data analyzed here, though it
appears often in the pages of the Révolutions de Paris.
20
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Finally, this thesis will make one exception to the rule: references to Antiquity made in
letters or speeches quoted in part or in whole by the journal will be counted in the statistical
tables. While they are of limited use as points of comparison, they can serve as reminders of the
ubiquity of classical allusions during this period. It was, moreover, important to include them to
provide a truly complete count of the classical references present in the Révolutions de Paris in
the summer of 1791. However, this thesis takes care to distinguish these outside references from
those made by the journal’s regular contributors in the statistical tables, where the figures
excluding outside references are followed, where applicable, by figures which take them into
account, in parentheses.
Before turning to the data, there is one last variable to examine: that of the readers and
their knowledge of Antiquity. Those among them who had attended a collège, where Latin
rhetoric was the principal subject of study would know them as well as the journal’s contributors,
but former collégiens formed a relatively limited élite. The Révolutions de Paris did not address
only a classically educated readership, however. If its democratic opinions and wide circulation
were not enough to suggest this, the fact that the journal almost always translated Latin quotes
into French, something that even the most democratic of pre-revolutionary writers had not done,
makes this point clear. The question remains, however: to what extent would most readers,
without the benefit of a collège or private tutor’s instruction, have understood the journal’s
references?
Given how profoundly 18th century French society was imbued with this classical culture,
one should not underestimate popular familiarity with it. First, in the course of the 18th century
translations of ancient texts multiplied, including the perennially popular Plutarch’s Lives of the
Noble Greeks and Romans, which recounted the biographies of many of the figures cited in the
Révolutions de Paris. The publication of recent works of history such as Rollin’s Histoire
26

romaine also flourished. The great number of prints and reprints in the course of the century
attest to their popularity. Considering the relatively high literacy rate at the end of the 18th
century, it is likely that many readers of the Révolutions de Paris could have been familiar with
these works. Moreover, the French Revolution came at the height of the neoclassical movement
in the arts: every two years the painting and sculpture salons displayed new artworks representing
scenes from Greco-Roman history and mythology to the public. The availability of relatively
inexpensive engravings also worked to popularize neoclassical imagery and the scenes and
figures it depicted.21
Antiquity was likewise well represented in theatrical representations both before and
during the Revolution. In particular, Voltaire’s two plays, “Brutus” and “La mort de César,”
which centered on Lucius Brutus, founder of the Roman Republic and his descendant, Marcus
Brutus, one of Caesar’s assassins, had been reprised starting in the 1780s. These plays were
surely responsible, at least in part, for the great popularity of “Brutus,” often amalgamated into a
single figure. The fine arts and those of the theatre would often reinforce each other: as Voltaire’s
plays were performed on the stage, Jacques-Louis David, preeminent painter of the neoclassical
movement, unveiled his painting “Les licteurs rapportent à Brutus les corps de ses fils.”22 The
sculptor Houdon even displayed his bust of the actor Larive in the role of Marcus Brutus in “La
mort de César.”23 The probable readership of the Révolutions de Paris was surrounded then on all
21
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sides by representations of Antiquity. The classically educated authors of the journal themselves
could not escape the influence of these representations, which necessarily inform the kinds of
references they made.
This widespread classical culture meant that the journal’s contributors could expect that
most of their classical allusions, and especially those that referred to the best-known figures, like
Brutus, would be understood. As the following chapters will show, the broadly consensual
interpretations displayed in these representations would have assured moreover in most cases that
these allusions would be understood as intended. In fact, the journal reports only one occasion
during the Varennes Crisis when this consensus was contested, when the public prosecutor of the
6th arrondissement, Bernard, denigrated patriots for citing Voltaire’s “Brutus.”24 This is no
coincidence. In this kind of case, the reference fails to accomplish its legitimizing function and
far from reinforcing the journal’s perspective, the journal must invoke its own principles to
defend its use of the reference. This case might well be considered the exception that proves the
rule, for this unwelcome inversion is doubtless one of the principal reasons why the journalists at
the Révolutions de Paris generally chose references that already functioned as well-defined
symbols in élite and popular culture alike.

III.

Statistical Tables
The four statistical tables which follow give the quantitative results of my survey of the

classical allusions found in issues 100-118 of the Révolutions de Paris. The first table gives an
overview of the data in general, while the three subsequent tables show the results for the
categories of Greece, Rome, and mythology respectively, in more detail.
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References to Antiquity
Antiquity

246
(264)
ref. /
53 (59)
art.

“Antiquity /
ancient /
Ancients”
Citations / Latin

10 (11) references in 8 (9) articles
15
(20)/14
(17)
art.

French

Latin

Historical

175
(196) /
48 (53)

Greece

4 (6)
/4
(5)
art.
11
(14)/
11
(13)
art.

44
(46)
/ 14
(16)
art.

Ancient
Modern

2 (4) references in 2 (3) articles
2 references in 2 articles

Citations

7 (10)
ref. in
7 (9)
articles

Mythological

131
(150)
/ 44
(47)
art.

46 (47) references in 24 (25) art.

29

5 (7)/5 (7)
articles

Without trans.

1/1 article

Locutions,
maxims, etc.

4/4 art.

“Greece /
Greeks”
Athens

6 references in 4 articles

Sparta

Rome

With
translation
(including
one partial
translation)
Without
translation
With trans.

Other
“Rome /
Romans”
Figures
Institutions /
offices
Events

21
(24)
/8
(10)
art.

2 (3)/2 (3)
articles
3/3 articles

“Athens / Athenians”
Figures

9
(10)/6
(7) art.
10 (12)
/ 9 (11)
art.
2/2 art.
7/7 art.
2/2 art.
1/1 art.

Institutions
“Sparta / Spartans”
Figures
Institutions
3 reference in 2 article
29 (30) references in 19 (21) articles
10/9
art.

47 (64) references in 30 (35) articles
55 references in 29 articles
1 reference in 1 article

References to Ancient Greece
Greece

44
(46)
/ 14
(16)
art.

“Greece/Greeks”
Athens

6 references in 4 articles
21
“Athens/Athenians”
(24) Figures
/8
(10)
art.

Institutions
Sparta

10/9
art.

“Sparta/Spartans”
Figures
Institutions

Other

7/2
art.

Figures

Other

9 (10) references in 6 (7) articles
10
Solon
(12) Aristides
/6
Demosthenes
(7)
Plato
art.
Anitus
Lais
Critias
2/2
Areopagus
art.
Ostracism
7 references in 7 articles
2/2
Lycurgus
art.
1/1
Helots
art.
4/2
Epictetus
art.
Dionysius
Philip of Macedon**
Homer
3/2
The Iliad
art.
Syracuse
Corinth

2/2 articles
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article
1 (2)/1 (2) art.
1/1 article
(1)/(1) article
1/1 article
1/1 article
2/2 articles
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article
1/1 article

References to Greco-Roman Mythology
Mythology

46
(47) /
24
(25)
art.

Hercules
Achilles
Telemachus
Mentor
Circe
Penelope
Sirens
Amazons
Argonauts/golden fleece
Codrus
Atlas
Galatea
Pegasus
Cerberus
Muses

Olympus/gods

Genius
Palladium

3 ref. in 2 articles, including 1 by name
1 reference in 1 article
2 references in 2 articles, including 1 to Fénelon’s « Télémaque »
3 references in 2 articles
2 references in 2 articles
1 reference in 1 article
2 references in 2 articles
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article (allusion to Florian’s « Galatée »)
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
3/2
« Muses »
1 reference in 1 article
art.
Melpomene
1 reference in 1 article
Thalia
1 reference in 1 article
17
« Olympus/gods »
4 (5) references in 2 (3) articles
(18) /
Mercury
2 references in 2 articles
9 (10) Apollo
2 references in 2 articles
art.
Juno
2 ref. in 2 art., including 1 « Lucina »
Venus
1 reference in 1 article
Iris
1 reference in 1 article
Comus
1 reference in 1 article
Plutus
1 reference in 1 article
Flora
1 reference in 1 article
Zephyrus
1 reference in 1 article
Themis
1 reference in 1 article
3 references in 2 articles
2 references in 2 articles
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References to Ancient Rome
Rome

131
(150) /
44 (47)
art.

“Rome/
Romans”
Figures

29 (30) references in 19 (21) articles
47 (64) /
30 (35)
art.

Brutus (excluding 2
references to the
“Junius’s Letters”)

Tiberius
Caligula
Claudius
Nero
Septimius Severus
Justinian
Valentinian
Horace
Cicero
Martial
Livy
Juvenal
Lucretius**
Seneca
Tacitus
Spurius Maelius
Manlius
Sulla
Lepidus
Triumph / triumphal

6 (7) ref. in 5 (6) articles, including 4 (5)
allusions to Voltaire’s « Brutus »
Marcus
3 (4) ref. in 3 (4) articles, including 1
allusion to Voltaire’s « Mort de César »
Ambiguous
2 (3) ref. in 2 (3) articles, all of which
References
are probably references to Marcus, since
1 (2) are associated with Cato and the
other with Marc Antony
4 (7) reference in 3 (6) articles (all probably references to Cato
the Younger)
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 (2) reference(s) in 1 (2) article(s)
1 reference in 1 article
3 (4) references in 3 (4) articles
1 (2) reference(s) in 1 (2) articles, including one biblical citation:
« Render unto Caesar… »
3 references in 3 articles
3 references in 3 articles
1 reference in 1 article
2 references in 2 articles
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
2 (3) references in 2 (3) articles, including 1 citation by name
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
1 reference in 1 article
(1) reference in (1) article
(2) references in (2) articles
(1) reference in (1) article
(1) reference in (1) article
(1) reference in (1) article
(1) reference in (1) article
16 references in 9 articles

Civic crowns / laurels

11 references in 9 articles

Dictator / dictatorship

9 references in 6 articles

Senate / senators

5 ref. in 4 art., including 1 cit. of Voltaire’s “Mort de César”

Lictors

3 references in 3 articles

Apotheosis

3 references in 3 articles

Spectacles

2 references in 2 articles

Gladiators

2 references in 1 article

Prefects

1 reference in 1 article

Vestals

1 reference in 1 article

Funerary inscriptions

1 reference in 1 article

Battle of Philippi*

1 reference in 1 article

Cato
Cassius
Cimber
Numa Pompilius
Horatii
Cincinnatus
Tarquin
Porsena
Catiline
Marc Antony
Caesar
« Caesars »

Institutions /
offices

Events

55/29 art.

1/1 art.
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11
(14)
art.

Lucius

As these tables show, following the parameters laid out above, a careful survey of the
journal found 246 allusions (264 including outside allusions) drawn from 53 (59) articles over 19
issues (n°100-118, 4 June-15 October 1791). While there are no issues which do not contain
classical references, more articles with titles (77) lack them than contain them. Furthermore,
certain articles contain more than others. Classical references may then be said to be prominent
but not predominant. This uneven distribution can be explained in part by the fact that unlike
Camille Desmoulins’s Révolutions de France et de Brabant, in which classical allusions abound25
– an example of this style can be seen in certain letters written by Desmoulins and published in
the Prudhomme’s journal – the Révolutions de Paris is an informational journal as much as a
vehicle for opinion.
Thus, references to Antiquity are almost never to be found in sections such as
“ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE,” which aims to give a succinct account of the debates and decrees
of the assembly. In all, 27 out of 77, or more than a third, of the articles without references are
under this heading or related headings such as “NOUVELLES ÉTRANGÈRES /
DÉPARTEMENTALES,” designed to briefly keep readers informed of foreign or departmental
affairs. Most of the rest are also informational articles, such as “Assembly on the Champ de
Mars,” from issue 105, which invites citizens to come sign the Cordeliers Club’s “republican”
petition or “Grievances of the former Beauce regiment against the National Constituent
Assembly,” the title of which accurately sums up the content. Classical allusions are more at
home in articles that comment on events than in those which simply report them.26
One of the most striking aspects of this data set is that references to Rome are much more
numerous than references to Greece. In fact, references to Rome are more numerous than
25

Camille Desmoulins, Les Révolutions de France et de Brabant in Albert Soboul, ed., Œuvres, (Munich: Kraus
Reprints, 1980).
26
RP, t. 9, n°105, p. 29 and t. 10, n°117, pp. 33-39.

32

references to Greece and mythological references, many but not all of which are Greek in origin,
put together. This preference can be attributed to the journal’s contributors’ likely greater
familiarity with Roman history, which can be explained in turn in large part by the kind of
education they received. All the major contributors to the Révolutions de Paris had been educated
in the collèges of the Ancien régime, where Latin rhetoric was the principal object of study.
Study of Greek, on the other hand, had already given way to the vernacular in the vast majority of
cases, the final result of a process that had begun in the previous century. It is not surprising then
that Roman references should outstrip those to Greece.
Nevertheless, references to Greece, taken as a whole, do not seem to belong to a different
register than references to Rome. In both categories are found a mix of positive and negative,
justificatory and denunciatory models, often expressed by way of analogy to present
circumstances, and generally taken entirely seriously. This is not the case for mythological
references, which is why this thesis separates them from historical references, whether Greek or
Roman.27 The journalists of the Révolutions de Paris used allusions to Greco-Roman mythology
to disparage and mock adversaries, in particular the royal family, often employing irony and
sarcasm. They applied these allusions chiefly to those who had held power under the Ancien
Régime and their allies among the constituted powers. This pattern is so striking that it may
suggest a rhetorical analogy between this usage and the manifest contempt of neoclassical artists
for the rococo style, associated both with mythology – at least in its more frivolous aspects – and
aristocratic mores. The following chapter will discuss this phenomenon further. In the meantime,
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Moreover, it would be difficult to separate out which elements belong to Greece and which to Rome in a
mythology which is properly Greco-Roman. A reference to the Roman god Comus, borrowed from the Etruscans,
would certainly count as a reference to Rome, but what of a reference to Juno? The name used is certainly that of the
Roman goddess and not her Greek counterpart, Hera, but it was conventional in 18th century France to refer to
Greco-Roman gods by their Roman names (in Gallicized form). Why attempt an inevitably arbitrary separation of
that which historical as well as linguistic logic brings together?
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there are certain aspects of the journal’s references to Antiquity which can best be observed
through analysis of the quantitative data.
Two characteristics of these data in particular should draw the attention. As noted above,
most references are concentrated in a relatively limited number of articles. In turn, most of these
articles contain at least two or three references each. A handful of particularly reference-rich
articles can contain considerably more. For example, the “La liberté française [French Liberty]”
alone, from issue 108, alludes to the Greeks, the Romans, “Codrus, king of Athens,” Cato and
Brutus (twice each), once more to Athens, Sparta, Tiberius, Demosthenes, Philip of Macedon, the
areopagus, Aristides, the “Senate of Rome,” “Dionysius, king of Syracuse, and schoolmaster in
Corinth,” the “golden age” of Greece, Athenians, and finally to “citizens of Rome.”28 This
unequal distribution can be explained in several different ways. As noted, the Révolutions de
Paris was an informational journal as much as an opinion-based one, but it is principally the
articles that reflect this last tendency that include classical references. It might seem obvious, but
it is worth noting that the journal cites Antiquity only when it can do so to good effect. Classical
allusions are absent from most articles that discuss concrete measures to be taken. The choice of
referents reflects this usage: references to individuals are by far the most common type, while the
reader is invited only twice to imagine that a practice or institution from Antiquity might be
applicable to revolutionary France.29
As far as the distribution of references in the articles that include them goes, it seems that
in general the more references an article contains, the more integral they are to its argument. As
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RP, t. 9, n°108, pp. 177-85.
In the article “Sur les subsistences.” from issue 116, the journal supports a policy of public subsidies to bakers by
noting that “If is by this means that the prefects of Rome were finally able to oppose the rise in the price of bread,”
while in the article “VOLTAIRE.” From issue 100, the journal gives the funerary practices of the Ancients as a
model, but only as far as they are deemed closer to nature, the only true model. What is more, the article suggestions
further on that the French people could and should invent their own practices even more closely attuned to nature.
RP, t. 8, n°100, pp. 447-49 and t. 9, n°116, pp. 574-75.
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will be discussed in the chapter three, if “La liberté française.” contains so many references, this
because the article’s primary goal is to contrast the “golden age” of Antiquity with France under
the period of repression following the Champ de Mars Massacre. In other articles, classical
allusions are more accessory, as for example in the article describing the Champ de Mars
Massacre, where the journalist30 depicts the doomed petitioners as “one of those majestic
assemblies, such as one saw in Athens and Rome.”31 The reference here legitimates the signers of
the petition by comparing them favorably to ancient peoples, in opposition to La Fayette, Bailly
and the Assembly “moderates,” who called them “factious” and accused them of fomenting
anarchy in order to justify the massacre. The use of the classical reference supports the
denunciation of these “moderates” as traitors to the people’s cause, but does not form the heart of
the argument.
The last observation the quantitative data allow is that of the kind of referent cited. Taking
historical referents first, one finds allusions to peoples, individuals, and, in a lesser degree,
practices or institutions from Antiquity. The referents that warrant the most references are those
to peoples and civilizations. One finds 29 (30 including exterior references) allusions to “Rome”
or the “Romans,” 6 to “Greece” or the “Greeks,” 9 (10) to “Athens” or the “Athenians,” 7 to
“Sparta” or the “Spartans” and one each to “Syracuse” and “Corinth.” While these references are
often coupled with those to individual figures or institutions, one must concur with Claude
Mossé, among others, that the preference given to the names of peoples over particular historical
events supports the thesis that the reference to Antiquity, even when it is ostensibly historic, is
not historicized, but more abstract. This thesis is particularly strong as regards the Spartans, for
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For clarity’s sake, though all articles are anonymous and it is likely that at least some were collaborations between
two or more journalists, unless a specific attribution has been made, this thesis will use the singular terms
“journalist” and “author” to refer to the writer(s) of any individual article.
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the seven references to “Sparta/Spartans” aside, there are only three other references relative to
Sparta, two to Lycurgus, who is supposed to have given Sparta its laws, and one two the helots,
Sparta’s slave underclass. This is doubtless due at least in part to what historians of Antiquity call
the “Spartan mirage,” but it is nevertheless apparent that for Greece in general, as for Rome, the
symbolism of a term like “Rome” or “Athenians” matters more than the detail of these peoples’
history.32
Historical personages are the most numerous category of referent, but the journal cites
most of them only once. Among the Romans there are 26 of this sort of referent (32 including
referents only used by “outside” contributors), counting “Brutus” as a single referent because it is
often difficult to tell whether it applies to the founder of the Republic or the tyrannicide. The
journal invokes nine Roman referents more than once, but only five three times or more:
“Brutus” eleven times, Cato four, Julius Caesar three (four), Tiberius and Caligula three times
each. To these one might add Horace, cited twice by regular contributors, but three times if one
counts one citation by Camille Desmoulins.33 The journal cites Brutus and Cato for their virtue;
Julius Caesar, Tiberius and Caligula as examples of tyranny; Horace as an author (two times out
of three the journal cites his writings without naming him). This distribution reflects that of the
Roman historical personage referents as a whole, which include 9 (11) models of virtue, 12 (14
tyrants or conspirators and 6 (8) writers. The prominence of models of virtue and tyrants suggests
the conflict between patriots, whose resolve must be affirmed, and partisans of the monarchy,
whose traitorousness must be denounced. References to Roman historical personages are rarely
neutral.
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One can see right away that for the Révolutions de Paris, Greece means Athens and
Sparta above all: among the personage-referents one finds 7 Athenians, 1 Spartan, and 4 from
other city-states, including Philip of Macedon, who was not Greek, but who is known for his role
in Greek history as the first to conquer Greece, which is to say 12 “Greeks” in all. Of these, only
Solon and Lycurgus (the only Spartan) merit more than two allusions, unless one counts an
outside reference to Anitus. The journal cites Solon and Lycurgus as wise legislators. With
Aristides and Epictetus, they are the four virtuous Greeks. Demosthenes is an ambiguous figure,
virtuous at the start, but bought at last by Philip of Macedon’s bribes. In this case the journal
references the corrupted Demosthenes, who belongs to the category of negative Greek referents,
along with Anitus, Critias, the hetaera(e) Lais, Philip of Macedon, and Dionysius, tyrant of
Syracuse.34 The first four of these negative referents were Athenians. They represent the
corruption often associated with this city-state alongside its grandeur. Philip and Dionysius are
simply tyrant figures, which the journal associates with Louis XVI. With the exception of these
last two figures, and contrary to the profile of the Roman references, the negative Greek referents
tend to be compared to partisans of the monarchy rather than the king himself, perhaps because
potential Greek tyrant figures were less well known. Finally, the journal cites Plato and Homer in
the same article, in their capacity as philosopher and bard, respectively, in order to persuade the
public that the illustrious dead are not best honored by panthéonisation.35 The article cites Plato
and especially Homer admiringly, but without any implicit suggestion that they should be
emulated or that they are like any contemporary figure.
The journal does not allude to many Greek institutions. It approves of the two Athenian
institutions it does cite, the areopagus and ostracism, but once again without any serious
34

There was more than one Athenian hetaera by the name of Lais. It is not clear to which one the Révolutions de
Paris is referring. In the case of Dionysius, tyrant is the technical Greek term, essentially signifying usurper.
35
RP, t. 8, n°100, pp. 447-48.

37

suggestion that revolutionary France should adopt them. Meanwhile, the helots of Sparta are
ironically equated with French aristocrats, in a rare confusion between literal slavery and the
metaphorical voluntary slavery of republican thought. As in other sources, the institution’s
connotations remain negative, if not in the way one might expect.36 Like the reference to Rome,
then, the reference to Greece is ambiguous, with admirable and deplorable aspects. More
importantly, in the case of Greece in particular, the few references cited are never invoked for the
purposes of emulation, whether implicitly or explicitly.
References to Roman institutions are much more numerous and central to the discourse of
the Révolutions de Paris than Greek institutions. In 29 articles, one finds 11 referents, which
between them make 55 references. The most important are “triumph/triumphal,” with 16
references in 9 articles, “civic crowns/oak crowns/laurels” with 11 references in 9 articles,
“dictator(s)/dictatorship” with 9 in 6 articles, and “senate/senators” with 5 in 4. The journal’s use
of the referents “triumph” or “triumphal” is too diverse to draw any certain and fixed
conclusions. Sometimes the journal uses them to make an ironic comparison between the Roman
institution and a particular circumstance, as when “the king is brought back in triumph” from
Varennes; the irony functions whether the king is the triumphing general or one of his captives. It
can also apply, however, with undoubtedly positive connotations, to the “triumphal chariot” on
which Voltaire’s ashes are borne to the Panthéon.37 Elsewhere, the journal suggests that “if he
had dared,” La Fayette would have had the Assembly vote “the triumphal honors to his cousin
[Bouillé] the butcher [massacreur] of Nancy,” also one of the organizers of the king’s flight.
However, since the article aims to ridicule La Fayette, it is clear that the reader is supposed to
36
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find the idea that this Roman institution might be literally applied to France absurd.38 The
reference to the Roman senate is equally variable. The senate invoked may be the virtuous
“republican” senate, represented by Brutus the tyrannicide and Cato the Younger, for which the
journalist ardently wishes: “may the National Assembly of the monarchy give way to the senate
of the Republic.”39 Yet it can also be the corrupt senate of Cato and Brutus’s colleagues, or of the
empire, to which the “moderate” majority of the Assembly are comparable.40
On the other hand, the journal views the institution of civic crowns favorably, even when
it critiques the awarding of this honor to the undeserving. In the pages of the journal the reference
is sometimes metaphorical, but it is also unique in that it was the only ancient institution invoked
by the journal to be adopted in revolutionary France. Thus, the journal recounts approvingly how
the people of Paris really crowned the patriot deputies Robespierre and Pétion with oak branches
on the last day of the Constituent Assembly. One might speculate that civic crowns were thus
favored for the same reasons that representations of Antiquity featured so prominently in the arts:
artists and revolutionaries alike associated its esthetic simplicity with virtue. After all, an oak
crown lacks the potential corrupting effect of more concrete recompenses.
Finally, the institution of dictatorship always has negative connotations for the
Révolutions de Paris. It is not so much that the journal’s contributors feared to see the institution
adopted as it existed in Ancient Rome, but rather that the Assembly might give dictatorial powers
to aristocratic officers, or even keep them for itself. The journal greets the proposition to give
such powers to four commissioners in order to reestablish discipline in the army by recalling
Bouillé’s brutal repression of patriot soldiers in Nancy, and draws an equivalence between the
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terms “dictator” and “tyrant.”41 When, in the repressive aftermath of the Champ de Mars
Massacre, the Assembly passed a decree against sedition, the journal expresses once more the
fear that “each officer will be, in his jurisdiction, an absolute dictator who will punish ad libitum
the most innocent acts as maneuvers and seditions.”42 For the Révolutions de Paris, dictatorship
is synonymous with abuse of power, for it escapes from the people’s control.
As noted above, mythological references form their own, necessarily metaphorical,
category. The Révolutions de Paris uses them less often than Roman, but less often than Greek
historical references. Out of 30 referents, 12 are cited more than once, if one counts references to
“muses” and to the individual muses Melpomene and Thalia (3 references in 2 articles), as well
as references to “Olympus/gods” and individual gods, together. The journal cites “Olympus” or
“gods” four times, (five with outside references), in 2 (3) articles; Mercury, Apollo, and Juno
twice each and seven other gods once each. All the gods together are accorded 17 (18) references
in 9 (10) articles. As these figures imply, one article will often cite several gods together. To
these referents one may add Hercules and “genius,” each cited three times, but only in two
articles. How many times a referent is cited matters less, however, than the category of use to
which it belongs. As previously noted, the Révolutions de Paris uses most mythological
references ironically or mockingly, for de-legitimizing ends. The following chapter will discuss
this usage more thoroughly and in context.
There are, however, exceptions to the mocking, ironic use of mythology. Hercules
represents the strength of liberty; Themis, goddess of justice, becomes its metonym; Telemachus
and Mentor are invoked in discussions on education, implicitly or explicitly with reference to
Fénelon’s Télémaque; the “conserving genius” is said to “still look after France’s wellbeing”;
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finally, Codrus, mythical king of Athens, exemplifies the only virtuous conduct for kings,
“[having] himself killed in order to return liberty to his country by his death.”43 As these
examples indicate, however, mythological references cannot bear the weight of the legitimization
the way historical references can. The allusion to Codrus is the only one where mythology is
taken as a model, and even then it is only a counterexample, for Louis XVI is not the virtuous
king who sacrifices himself for his people’s happiness. The manifest fiction of mythology makes
it best suited to mockery.
The pages that follow will look at a single journal and its classical references and attempt
to analyze them in the context of the events of the summer of 1791 and the debates they
generated around questions of monarchy, republicanism and the rights of man and citizen. It is
impossible to overemphasize the importance of immersion in these debates in order to understand
them. After all, the interest of studying a rhetorical tool such as classical allusions lies in how the
questions under debate and the references used mutually inform each other. It would be a
mistake, therefore, to linger too long on the quantitative data of statistical tables; those examined
here can serve to indicate the contours of our data, but not explain its significance. The following
chapters will take up that task, demonstrating the ways in which the Révolutions de Paris used
classical references to de-legitimize the monarchy and its partisans and legitimize a new
republican regime.
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Chapter Two
I.

The Varennes Crisis

On the night of 20-21 June 1791, Louis XVI, also known as the “restorer of French
liberty,” took flight with his family. Betraying his oath to reign as a constitutional monarch, he
left behind an unequivocally absolutist manifesto. After abandoning the Tuileries Palace in Paris
under cover of darkness, the royal family headed for the Austrian frontier in an enormous yellow
carriage, the king disguised as the valet of his own wife, Marie-Antoinette, who took on the role
of a Prussian aristocrat, the Baroness de Korff, while the young dauphin was dressed as a girl. On
the other side of the Rhine an army awaited them to march against the French capital, Louis XVI
at its head. Meanwhile, Paris, and France, awoke the morning of 21 June to find themselves in a
de facto republic. 1 Faced with the incontrovertible fact of the king’s betrayal, all over France
people began to ask themselves: does France need a king after all?
The king’s flight marked a fundamental turning point of the French Revolution.
According to the historian Raymonde Monnier, it not only de-legitimized the monarchy, but also
“revived the democratic and republican movement in the medium term.”2 The Révolutions de
Paris played an active role in these movements, employing classical allusions to legitimize its
arguments. This chapter will look at the ways in which this journal emphasized the illegitimacy
of the monarchy, using mythological references to ridicule the king and his supporters and
framing the debate in terms of recognizable symbols from Antiquity. In order to understand how
the discourse of the Révolutions de Paris fits into the debates surrounding the monarchy in the
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summer of 1791, however, it will be useful to spend a moment examining the circumstances of
the king’s flight and the different reactions it elicited in French society.
The king’s flight was important chiefly because it demonstrated that the constitutional
monarchy as established over the first two years of the Revolution had become untenable. More
immediately, it created a power vacuum. The head of the executive branch was of course literally
absent, but more importantly, he had betrayed his oaths of fidelity to the Revolution. The
Assembly immediately responded to the first problem, first, by sending envoys to bring Louis
and his family back to Paris, and then by a series of emergency measures that temporarily turned
France into a de facto republic.
The second problem would not be as easily resolved. In the eyes of public opinion, the
king’s flight definitively de-legitimized the monarchy. In the streets of Paris symbols of royalty
were covered or destroyed, while petitions flowed in to the Assembly from all over France
calling for the king to be permanently deposed. Some advocated the regency, with the young
dauphin as king, in order to preserve the nearly complete constitution of 1791. However, a
growing movement, feeling betrayed as much by the violations of the principles of the
Declaration of Rights inscribed in the constitution as much as by the king, began to envision a
republican alternative. The Révolutions de Paris was among the leading mouthpieces of this
movement.
The Constituent Assembly had other ideas, however. Fearing the republic and distrustful
of the regency, the moderate majority invented the fiction that the king had been kidnapped, in
mind if not in body. Bouillé, one of the major organizers of the king’s flight, best known for his
brutal repression of the supposed insubordination of patriot soldiers in Nancy, came to the
Assembly’s aid by claiming full responsibility. Once their emissaries had safely escorted the
royal family back to Paris, this fiction allowed the Assembly to offer Louis the crown once more,
43

on the condition that he accept the constitution. However, no one believed the Assembly’s
version of events. The king had left behind a letter in his own hand, renouncing all his oaths and
explaining his decision to take flight. It had undeniably been his choice.
For the nascent republican movement, the Assembly’s decision represented yet another
betrayal, following on that of the king. The Society of the Rights of Man and Citizen, also known
as the Cordeliers Club, because of the former monastery in which they met, decided to petition
against the Assembly’s decision. The Assembly responded, on 17 July 1791, by having the
petitioners massacred by the National Guard.3 This incident, known to history as the Champ de
Mars Massacre, marked the beginning of a new period of repression.
The day after the massacre the Assembly voted a decree against sedition that would apply
retroactively.4 The wording is such that anyone publically disagreeing with the National
Assembly’s decrees could potentially be implicated. It seems that the Assembly’s strategy
consisted in removing the most prominent patriots from public life until the king’s acceptance of
the constitution became accomplished fact5. In the days that followed, denunciations and arrests
multiplied and a number of presses were seized.6 Moreover, during this period the Assembly’s
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revisions to the constitution of 1791 added to its already numerous violations of the principles of
the Declaration of Rights.7
Once the Constitution of 1791 had been revised and accepted by the king, 13 September
1791, the Assembly’s priorities changed. In order to be sure that this acceptance would bring the
rupture created by the Varennes crisis to a close and that there would be no more to fear from
democratic or republican claims, the Assembly had to enforce a kind of collective amnesia
regarding the events of that crisis and the feelings of betrayal they provoked. And so the
Assembly decreed a general amnesty for the “events of the Revolution” the day after the king’s
acceptance. In historian Sophie Wahnich’s words, by this amnesty, the Constituent Assembly
“decreed concord” (“décréta la concorde”).8 As the phrase “to decree concord” implies, this was
a false concord, imposed from above. The Assembly’s aim in voting the amnesty was surely to
end the Revolution by preventing future dissensions, but the strategy’s artificiality doomed it to
failure.9 For patriots like those who wrote for the Révolutions de Paris there had been betrayals
that could neither be forgotten nor forgiven. The Revolution would continue in spite of the
Assembly.
In the meanwhile, the Varennes Crisis remains a key moment in the Revolution, for it saw
the constitutional monarchy lose all remaining legitimacy and marks the beginnings of a
widespread and popular republican movement. Without this crisis, it is unlikely that the
monarchy would have been overthrown or the republic proclaimed a year later. In the summer of
1791, however, the suggestion that France should start over with a new republican constitution
7
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was still too new and potentially frightening to stand alone. A republican journal like the
Révolutions de Paris turned to references to Antiquity, drawn from a shared culture, for rhetorical
and material support for these new ideas. In the following section this thesis will therefore
examine their role in the de-legitimization of the figure of the king and of the institutions of the
constitutional monarchy, before turning in the following chapter to their use in the debates
relative to republicanism.

II.

The Révolutions de Paris Against the King and the Constitutional Monarchy

As soon as they learned of the king’s flight, the first reaction of the entire patriot press
and of the Révolutions de Paris in particular was outrage. Even if, according to Censer, the
Révolutions de Paris had ceased to trust the king as early as the month of July 1790 and began to
be outright suspicious, if not hostile, towards him starting in April of 1791, they had not predicted
this eventuality. In the first article of issue 102, dated 18-25 June 1791, and titled “King’s Flight,
21 June 1791” (“Fuite du roi le 21 juin 1791”), the journal thunders against those whom it
accuses of sustaining the illusion that the king had rallied the Revolution, as much as against the
king himself:
THE most honest man in his kingdom! (cowardly writers, inept or salaried
scribblers [folliculaires], that’s what you called Louis XVI.) The most honest man
in his kingdom, this father of the French, following the example of the hero of two
worlds [La Fayette], has also left his post then, and flees in hope of sending us, in
exchange for his royal person, a foreign and internal war of many years.10
The bitter irony directed against Louis XVI may well have been sharpened by disappointment, or
even the journalists’ anger at themselves for having been unable to predict, let alone prevent, the
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crisis.11 However, on the level of rhetoric, it seems that the author or authors of this article are
rather far from blaming themselves for not having been sufficiently vigilant, exclaiming:
“Citizens! You owe us justice; remember in this moment that we did not wait for the dénouement
of 21 June to tell you what kings are capable of.”12 This anterior recognition of the evils of kings
serves as a way out of any feeling of guilt for not having prevented the flight to Varennes: it is
not Prudhomme’s journal’s fault if readers did not take its warnings seriously.
At the same time, the Révolutions de Paris exaggerates the trust which the people had
placed in the king, in order to highlight Louis’s perfidy. This is the function of one of this
article’s two classical allusions. This reference emerges in a sequence contrasting the attitudes of
the king and queen in the weeks before their flight with the flight itself – which, it should be
recalled, represents an absolute betrayal and, it would have been reasonable to believe at the time,
the prelude to foreign and civil war. This particular reference attacks Antoinette in particular,
whose instigating role the journal accurately guesses:
In the evening, Antoinette walks the old boulevards, decked in roses like Flora.
Zephyrus is on her knees; it’s the dauphin. She smiles; her false face depicts the
calm of an honest woman, converted to patriotism. Good Parisians! The air of
satisfaction which fools you is the sign of Antoinette’s disloyalty. The clever siren
is taunting you; tomorrow, before daybreak, she will accomplish the plan she has
so long meditated; she is enjoying in advance the ills of anarchy which she seems
to already see you fallen a prey to at the departure of her imbecilic husband.13
In this passage, the journalist compares Antoinette to two figures from Greco-Roman mythology:
Flora, Roman goddess of flowers and agriculture in general, and a siren, a creature half woman,
half fish14 which draws sailors to their death by seducing them with their beautiful voices. The
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gendered and sexualized nature of these references, which will be discussed at greater length later
in this chapter, are used to express Antoinette’s hypocrisy and the danger she represents.
The first figure evokes nature, spring, innocence. This is Antoinette’s mask. The
perfection of this façade explains how the people could have been fooled so easily. At the same
time, the contrast between this façade and Antoinette’s thoughts completes the picture of her
hypocrisy. The third figure appearing in this passage, that of Zephyrus, is accessory to the figure
of Flora. Zephyrus, the lover rather than the son of Flora, is doubtless a strange choice to
represent the dauphin. Should this be seen, however, as a kind of foreshadowing of the incest
charge that would be leveled against Antoinette more than two years later? This seems unlikely,
especially given how the journalist employs the couple Flora-Zephyrus here. Zephyrus is a prop
in Antoinette’s staging of innocence, the danger of which is in its realism. There is no room in the
mise en scène itself for perversity, since it springs rather from the contrast between the innocence
of the projected vision and the well-hidden rejoicing at the thought of public misfortunes.
The figure of the siren accomplishes a similar, though not entirely identical, result. The
figure of the queen as siren is not new: historian Annie Duprat has found it alongside that of the
queen as harpy in revolutionary but also earlier caricatures.15 A siren is always a monster, indeed,
a sexualized monster, and its use reveals the persistence of the mythos of the dangers of the
queen as sovereign going back to the Salic Laws which prevented women from inheriting the
crown. But in this circumstance, the reference plays a more specific role, for the siren, symbol of
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the close union between enticing beauty and death is fundamentally a figure of betrayal. In
making Antoinette into a siren, the journalist insists not only on her evil intentions, or on her
suspect status as queen but on the real danger that she represents at this particular juncture. In this
the reference differs from the image of Flora with Zephyrus in her lap: it is easy to laugh at the
idea of the goddess of flowers hatching plots and indeed the slightly ironic tone invites the reader
to do so, but the siren is a more fundamental threat, all the more so because she is “clever.”
Antoinette as siren is the one who invents these seductive disguises, and her intelligence belongs
to the monster, whatever its outward appearance. This passage serves as a warning to the reader
not to trust in appearances when it comes to Antoinette, whose true character has been revealed
by her role in the flight to Varennes.
While Antoinette becomes a monstrous figure, the king plays the role, in this first
depiction of his flight of a criminal tyrant. The Révolutions de Paris wonders: “Has the
executioner ever stricken, with his homicidal bar [a reference to breaking on the wheel], more
consummate scoundrels than those who have just evacuated the château of the Tuileries by night?
Julius Caesar stabbed by the Romans, Charles I decapitated by the English, were innocent, in
comparison to Louis XVI.”16 As in the passage on Antoinette cited above, several different
rhetorical devices are at work in this citation. First, it establishes a triple parallel between Julius
Caesar, a figure from Antiquity and Charles I, a figure from “recent” history, then between these
two personages and Louis XVI, and finally between all three and the common criminal. As these
parallels suggest, none of these figures was particularly admired by patriots – quite the opposite,
in fact. In the case of Caesar, the only “Ancient” of this quartet, the Révolutions de Paris is
tapping into 18th century conventional wisdom, which, in the centuries-long debate regarding the

16

RP, t. 8, n°102, p. 526

49

personage’s character, came down firmly on the side of Caesar-as-tyrant.17 There is no need for
the journal to make the meaning of the reference explicit; the journal’s readership already
associated Caesar with tyranny, even, moreover, when a given reader’s only exposure to Caesar
might have been through a play or a work of art.
The parallel between Caesar and Charles I might seem more controversial. However, it is
not original either. The protagonists of the English Revolution, such as Algernon Sydney, had
already compared Charles I to Caesar in the 17th century.18 As Raymonde Monnier demonstrates,
theorists from the English Revolution had considerable influence on the patriots of the French
Revolution.19 It is unsurprising then, that the Révolutions de Paris would place Caesar and
Charles I in the same category as tyrants. Moreover, this parallel signifies that here at least the
reference to antiquity is not of a different nature than the reference to more recent history. In this
circumstance, the distance separating the era, or eras of revolution(s) from antiquity can be
compressed, allowing for a universal judgment that transcends time and place: a tyrant is a tyrant,
in whatever era he lives.
These multiple parallels might suggest equivalence. This is doubtless the case for the first
three figures, that between the criminal (“scélérat”), on the one hand and Julius Caesar and
Charles I on the other.20 What is a tyrant, after all, if not the greatest of criminals, who not only
breaks the laws but also puts himself above them? It would have been enough perhaps just to
mention Louis XVI in such disreputable company. The Révolutions de Paris goes one step
further, describing Louis, in seemingly hyperbolic fashion, not only as a tyrant, but as the worst
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of all tyrants. This is, evidently a kind of a rhetorical device, the logic of which advances by
degrees: What is worse than a criminal? A tyrant. Than a tyrant? Louis XVI.
However, one would do well to wonder whether this reference might not contain a more
considered historical judgment. Is it merely hyperbole, or is there something that really does
make Louis XVI worse than other tyrants? Could it be that for patriots he unites the most
dangerous traits of Julius Caesar and Charles I? It has been amply demonstrated that it was
Louis’s intention to return to Paris as a conqueror (if with the support of the provinces, which he
falsely believed he would have), like Caesar crossing the Rubicon. The near certain result would
have been civil war, as in Ancient Rome and 17th century England.21 Like Charles I, but unlike
Caesar, the source of Louis’s power had generally been considered legitimate up to this point.
Louis and Charles I also shared an unshakeable belief in their divine right to rule. Finally, like
Caesar, or at least the Caesar of revolutionary imagining, Louis hid his true ambitions behind a
constitutional façade. This duplicity, revealed by flight to Varennes, is perhaps the most
important element of this portrait of Louis XVI as tyrant. On a deeper level, the two references
complement each other to complete it. Louis XVI joined the “legitimate” power, or, more
importantly, power that would have been considered legitimate by most, whether by divine right
or the constitution, of Charles I to the audacity and cynicism of Caesar. This combination is what
makes him the most dangerous of tyrants.
Despite this status as the supreme example of tyranny that the Révolutions de Paris
immediately accorded to Louis XVI, after this first account of his flight, the journal turned its
attention away from him, making the “moderate” majority of the National Assembly and its
supporters its main target. This raises the question of why, after having made such an effort to
demonstrate that Louis XVI is the worst of all tyrants, the journal would abandon this target so
21
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easily. The key to this enigma lies in the change in the balance of power indicated earlier: Louis
XVI at the head of an army would have been dangerous in and of himself; Louis XVI suspended
from power, captive in the Tuileries, was dangerous only through what others, and especially
those who held real power, believed about his legitimacy or viability as a king. The contributors
to the Révolutions de Paris understood that now the real danger came from the National
Assembly and the institutions behind it: the National Guard, the municipality of Paris, the courts.
From this point on then, they would direct most of their criticisms or attacks against these
powers.
Initially, the journalists of the Révolutions de Paris were wary of the National Assembly,
but believed nonetheless that the king’s flight had provided the opportunity to persuade or even to
force them to adopt a program more favorable to patriots’ demands. The author of an article on
“the insufficiency of the right of petition,” also from issue 102, makes this point: “The great and
memorable day of the 21st has lifted many obstacles that it would have been difficult for us to
clear; but thanks to the crime of the modern Tarquin, now we have only to follow the simple
route of addressing the National Assembly itself directly; the circumstances have reduced it to the
happy necessity of listening to us.”22 The article here transfigures the king into Tarquin, which is
to say Tarquinius Superbus, last king of Rome, who was banished to make way for the Roman
Republic. The reference to Tarquin would have made the journal’s readers think of this transition
between monarchy and republic and suggests the ultimately republican aims of the Révolutions
de Paris. The story of Tarquin serves as a kind of precedent: because it suggests a republican
solution to the problem of tyrannical kings, it allows the journalist to suggest it as well. At this
delicate junction, when the king had not yet been brought back to Paris and when France had
become a de facto republic, it was still possible to believe that the king’s flight, like the rape of
22
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Lucretia perpetrated by Tarquin’s nephew, could serve as catalyst for the establishment of a de
jure republic. It was, at least, within the power of the Assembly to deliberate on this point, and in
the king’s absence, the journalist could believe that the Assembly would be forced to take the
idea seriously.
From the start of the Varennes Crisis, however, the Assembly’s conduct did not lend itself
very well to these hopes. Already, in the first article recounting the king’s flight the Révolutions
de Paris had been obliged to remark that the Assembly had welcomed “by murmurs” (of
disapproval) one deputy’s proposal to replace the formula for the promulgation of new laws
“Louis by the grace of God” with “the sacramental words: The National Assembly has decreed
and orders.” And the journalist comments with a quote from Horace (though without naming
him): “O servum pecus! / Herd of slaves!”23 The Latin citation’s main function here seems to be
to give weight to the accusation by establishing the journalist’s erudition.
The choice of this particular quote is not random, however; the dialectic between tyrants
and slaves constitutes an important motif in classical republican theory. “Slavery” in this context
signifies the voluntary abandonment of one’s dignity as a free man in choosing to serve a master.
When republican thinkers first adopted this idea in Antiquity, it was conceived in literal as well
as metaphorical terms and served to justify slavery: if a free man should kill himself rather than
submit to slavery, then slaves have no one to blame but themselves for their servitude. By the
time of the French Revolution, however, the usage had become purely metaphorical and
coexisted with patriots’ identification with and sympathy for actual slaves, especially once the
insurrection began in Saint-Domingue in August of 1791. This seeming contradiction highlights
the way in which patriots adapted ideas originating in Antiquity to their own conception of the
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universality of natural rights, strengthening the ideal of “live free or die”24 by divorcing it from a
justification of slavery.
For the Révolution de Paris, in failing to seize the opportunity to rid France of royalty, the
National Assembly lowered itself to the king’s level, as the title of an article recounting the royal
family’s return to Paris attests: “Louis XVI’s Conspiracy, and Perfidious Conduct of the National
Assembly.” Perfidy was now a quality that the Assembly, or at least its “moderate” majority,
shared with the king. And if the Assembly was perfidious, it was because its right-wing had
already begun to propose, now that the king had returned, the solution which would win out in
the end. Louis would be offered the choice to accept the constitution and reign once more, a
refusal resulting in the regency for the dauphin.25 This proposition provoked a citation of
Voltaire’s “Mort de César” on the part of the Révolutions de Paris: “‘Caesar…. Still wants the
crown; / The people refuses it, and the senate bestows it.’” It is not surprising to see this play of
Voltaire’s cited, though it is little known today. Patriots appreciated Voltaire in two main
capacities, one of which was as the author of “Brutus” and the “Mort de César.”26 Half of the
references that the Révolutions de Paris makes to Brutus over this period are actually references
to Voltaire’s plays. As previously noted, the figure of Brutus owes its popularity in large part to
his portrayal in these works. While the plays are not without their ambiguities, the patriot reading
sees them as testaments of liberty against the tyranny represented here by Caesar, in “Brutus” by
Tarquin.
As the ellipses indicate, the author of the article modified Voltaire’s verse. In the original
play, it is by these lines that Metellus Cimber, one of Caesar’s future assassins, finishes his
24
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account of the famous scene drawn from Plutarch where Caesar refuses the crown that Marc
Antony offers him before the people.27 Cimber fears that the “corrupt half” of the senate will
prove more favorable to Caesar’s ambitions than the people have, and so he warns, in the first
half of the verse that “Caesar, already too much a king, wants the crown too” (“veut encore la
couronne”)28. In other words, Caesar already has de facto royal power, but wants it made official.
In removing the words “already too much a king” from the verse, the journalist changes its
meaning so that it applies better to Louis XVI. Louis lost his crown by fleeing, he wants it back
encore. The basic meaning does not change, however: the Assembly, like the Roman senate, is
betraying the people, of whom they are simple delegates, according to the theory of popular
sovereignty, in acceding to the guilty ambitions of the tyrant. The authority of such a figure as
Voltaire, whose remains the Assembly itself had already planned to place in the newly
consecrated Panthéon before the Varennes Crisis, gives added legitimacy to the comparison.
When the Assembly decreed on 15 July 1791, that the king, rendered inviolable by the
constitution, would receive the opportunity to reign once more, the classical allusions made by
the Révolutions de Paris corresponded to patriots’ three principal reactions: disappointment,
anger, but also bitter and ironic amusement. Disappointment first: the journalist displays a
reluctance, whether sincere or purely rhetorical, to believe that the king could be place back upon
the throne: “If this was so, all energetic feeling would be forever exiled from our hearts; there
would be nothing left for us but to avert our eyes from Sparta and Rome, to cover them with a
funereal band, and to present our heads to the knife.”29 This passage shows a profound
discouragement. Paradoxically, it also includes the first positive reference to Antiquity this
27
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chapter has examined so far. Sparta and Rome do not represent cities mired in history here,
places where corrupt senates collaborate with tyrants. Rather, these are Rome and Sparta “in their
golden age [beaux jours]” as other issues of the Révolutions de Paris, and most other sources
from the period that cite Antiquity have it, which is to say in a mythical Antiquity where
republican virtue reigns.
In references such as this, Antiquity becomes an abstract symbol and it is not so much
Rome or Sparta to which the journalist aspires, but the dreamed of republic. This is not to say that
the dreamed of republic would take the form of Rome or Sparta; the journal’s patriot ideal
remains anchored in natural rights philosophy, unknown to Antiquity. Rather, it is as if the article
were saying: Rome (or Sparta) was a republic, we too aspire to republicanism; if we cease to
aspire to republicanism, then we will never attain the full measure of what we can achieve. It
does not matter that republicanism did not signify the same thing in France at the end of the 18th
century as in Antiquity. The journalist knew that it did not and rejoiced in the progress that the
Declaration of Rights represents. What mattered was the aspiration itself. In this passage, the
journalist makes clear the stakes: the right to aspire to the republic will be lost if the Assembly is
allowed to reestablish royalty. One cannot help but think here of Rousseau’s warning, which was
doubtless in the minds of the author(s) of this passage as well: “Free peoples, remember this
maxim: liberty can be acquired; but it is never recovered.”30 The fear of losing, perhaps forever,
the opportunity to become free is palpable. It is in this context that the anger directed against an
Assembly potentially responsible for the eternal loss of liberty must be understood.
This anger manifests itself in the same article with two other allusions to Antiquity. These
allusions apply to the king, but the attack is directed against the Assembly. One should not forget
30
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that the Assembly held all power in this moment. The Révolutions de Paris was horrified by the
farce the Assembly was acting out by alleging the king’s inviolability as a pretext to return the
reins of power to him:
Go on, vile senators! You are as absurd as you are vicious! […] Will [his]
inviolability shelter him [the king] from all investigation? Yes, say the senators,
friends of the civil list,31 [his] inviolability extends to everything. An inviolable
king! Were he a Nero, a Caligula, a Louis XIV, a Louis XVI, he is inviolable and
sacred! Arson, rape, murder, everything is permitted to him; and the citizenry
have no right to ask for, and the nation has no right to bring him to, justice!32
Once more figures from different eras are placed on the same footing. There is no mystery in the
choice of referents. Caligula and Nero remain even to this day figures of the tyrant par excellence
and the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV is the polar opposite of the patriot ideal. Moreover, all
these figures exemplify the dangers of absolute power and the impunity that accompanies it. One
might find it incongruous to see Louis XVI placed beside Roman emperors known chiefly for
their perversity, given his well-published rejection of the debauchery of his predecessors.
However, it seems that in this case what counts is not so much the kind of crime, but a ruler’s
ability to pursue his ends with impunity. Inviolability does not so much turn Louis XVI into
Caligula, then, but rather into a more dangerous version of himself, one who can further the
counterrevolution, rather than his own pleasures, with impunity.
While the author of this article fears the monster that the Assembly is creating by
declaring the king inviolable, the absurdity of the situation does not escape him. The “senators,”
corrupted by money from the civil list, are “as absurd as they are vicious.” Further on, the
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journalist returns to this motif with comical imagery drawn from mythology: the desire to return
to the status quo ante upon the acceptance of the constitution by the king “Is a turn of the game
bag [tour de gibecière] worthy of Comus’ valets.”33 Comus, Roman god of banquets, is here a
placeholder for Louis XVI, notorious for his gluttony, to the point that following his flight he was
often represented as a pig in caricatures.34 The image of the game bag also attacks his love for
hunting, an aristocratic and therefore disreputable passion. The game that his valets, which is to
say the Assembly, offer him is, of course, the people. This too is perhaps yet another reference to
Antiquity; as the journal remarked already in issue 100, “man-eating kings” is a Homeric
locution.35 However that may be, the journalist’s aim is to use the ridicule as a weapon, through
the reference to Antiquity, in order to place the Assembly’s legitimacy in doubt by demonstrating
that its decision to return Louis XVI to power is a farce.
This device can be found in other articles as well, always using mythological references
and in the same mocking tone, often with an added gendered or sexualized dimension. The
Assembly, which had ceased to follow the principles of its own Declaration of Rights, “resembles
Penelope, who nightly undid what she had embroidered by day.”36 The irony of the allusion
becomes clear when one recalls that Penelope is the figure from Antiquity most symbolic of
fidelity and employs her ruse in its cause, while this Assembly-Penelope has in no way remained
faithful to the people, whom it betrays by the same ruse. The gendered aspect of this image of the
Assembly as a wife who has been unfaithful to her husband-people is apparent. Elsewhere, the
genders are flipped, however and the Assembly, when represented by its male deputies, can also
be unfaithful to its “wife,” the nation, in the arms of a feminized court. The corrupt deputies,
33
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“transformed into swine, prostitute themselves at the court of a new Circe [Antoinette].”37 In
these examples, corruption is feminized, but this is not always the case. In an article which
wonders: “Is the Revolution Over Once the Constitution is Accepted by the King?” the journalist
chooses masculine figurants to represent corruption: “From the four corners of France, Argonauts
ready for anything, are already rushing in for the conquest of the Golden Fleece.”38 The
Argonauts are in this case the candidates to the Legislative Assembly and the Golden Fleece the
money of the civil list, returned to the king’s control upon his acceptance of the constitution.
kings can be corrupting influences as well as queens.
Whenever this kind of gendered or sexualized imagery is present, the question arises of
whether it can be attributed to misogyny, and with it the equally important question of the degree
to which modern standards can be applied to 18th century discourse, but here there is no simple
answer. Chaumette, to whom the article with the reference to Circe-Antoinette is attributed, as
well as Maréchal, insisted that women should be confined to the private sphere, and for them it is
certainly true that any incursion of women into politics would be a sign of corruption.39 Robert
himself, whose wife, Louise Kéralio, was also a journalist and militant of the fraternal societies,
did not combat these prejudices about a woman’s proper place.40 However, it is important to ask
whether these references are actually operating on this register, taking them case by case. First,
regarding the Assembly as a kind of perverted Penelope, there is certainly an implicit suggestion
in this reference that the defining characteristic of virtuous women is to be faithful to their
husbands. This is reinforced when taken together with a reference that blames men’s infidelity on
a woman (Circe-Antoinette, in this case). On the other hand, it should be remembered that this
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“assembly” is a feminine word in French, if one wished to personify it in order to better criticize
it, the logical choice would be as a female figure. Moreover, as the reference to the Argonauts
demonstrates, the journal does not privilege women in its mythological gallery of corruption.
The case of Antoinette-Circe, or for that matter of the Antoinette-siren from earlier, is not
altogether the same. It is undeniable that for certain revolutionaries, or indeed Ancien Régime
pamphleteers, Antoinette was a figure of contempt at least in part because she was a woman with
some political influence, if not outright power. It is probable that this fear of women in power
(even unofficial power) was an element of the criticism patriots like Chaumette or Maréchal
formulated against her. It is however equally undeniable that there were a number of good
reasons for opponents of counterrevolution to execrate Antoinette whatever their views on the
role of women. She was, after all, as patriots suspected but could not prove, the main instigator of
the king’s flight, and she had on every occasion, from the beginning of the Revolution, proved
herself the most violent enemy of revolutionary principles. Even before the Revolution she had
opposed all attempts at reform. The authors of the Révolutions de Paris did not need to read her
correspondence to know that she considered them to be “monsters,” and it was only natural for
them to return the sentiment.41 Given all this, I would argue that in turning Antoinette into a
mythological monster, the journal is using misogynistic imagery to largely political ends.
Further demonstrating, moreover, that not all gendered or sexualized references are the
same, the Révolutions de Paris compares the Assembly to a siren toward the end of the summer
of 1791, as it did Antoinette at the beginning, but the meaning is altered. In the first issue of
September 1791, the journal cites the Roman poet Horace: “For several months now it [the
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Assembly] has nattered on [radote]42 or put itself up for sale; just like that monster described by
Horace: a beautiful woman to the waist, whose body ends in a fish tail: / Desinet in piscem mulier
formosa superne. / ART. POET.” As discussed above, the journal began, at the moment of the
king’s flight, with an Antoinette-siren deceiving the people with a façade of innocence. The
Assembly-siren seems to be of a different character. First, it fools no one. It has no seductive
façade; one recognizes it right away for a “monster.” Thus, on the point of transferring its power
to the Legislative Assembly, it loses its dangerous character, becoming a pathetic, contemptible
figure, ridiculous in its monstrosity. Its betrayal has been known so long that it no longer has the
power to surprise.
The transfer of a symbolic language from the royal family to the National Assembly also,
of course, signifies a change in the locus of real power, but just as crucially, it allows for a
parallel to be drawn between the moment of the king’s flight and that of the Assembly’s
repression. At the moment of the king’s flight, the people were at the mercy of the royal family,
disarmed by the shock of the betrayal; in the repression of the summer of 1791, the people were
disarmed as well, this time by the Assembly. But the second betrayal is worse, for there is
nowhere to turn between a traitorous royal family and Assembly and a muzzled republican
movement. The only arm remaining to the journalist, powerless before the forces of reaction, at
least for the moment, is therefore ridicule, to which the reference to mythology is well-adapted.
Thus, as this chapter has observed, the Révolutions de Paris illustrates the illegitimacy of
the constitutional monarchy by ridiculing it through references to Greco-Roman mythology or
appealing to a network of recognizable symbols: the tyrant, the corrupt senate, the “golden age”
of Greece and Rome. The representation of the royal couple themselves remains static during this
period, as the flight to Varennes definitively extinguishes any glimmer of hope that might have
42
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still survived that the king had truly rallied the Revolution. From that moment on, the king could
only be a tyrant, the queen a monster of corruption. On the other hand one can see the journal
waver on the kinds of references to apply to the Assembly. Its contributors hesitated between
attempts to shame the Assembly into returning to its original principals and appeals to the people
to act as witnesses against the Assembly and its prevarications, before resigning themselves to
acting as contemptuous but powerless witnesses against its corruption. They attempted to shame
the Assembly by comparing it to Voltaire’s corrupt Roman senate or by invoking the authority of
a Roman author like Horace. They reminded the people what they stood to lose in failing to
impose their will on their representatives by invoking the abstracted ideal of Sparta and Rome.
Finally, they used mythology first to make the people see that the Assembly was no longer worth
of their trust, this kind of reference ultimately degenerating into a caustic but impotent
commentary.
It may be observed throughout this chapter that for the Révolutions de Paris the National
Assembly betrayed the people not only by allying itself with the king, but also by turning its back
on the principles of natural rights and popular sovereignty which the journal considers that it had
a mandate to defend. Although the crisis of Varennes was not the first time that the Assembly had
violated the principles of the Declaration of Rights, its response to this crisis provided a striking
example of its desire to repress the popular movement, making the gulf between the people and
their representatives apparent to all. Thus, the de-legitimization of the Assembly had a double
character, manifest in its alliance with the king, but also in its rejection of the real sovereign, the
people. The crisis of Varennes represented therefore an impasse not only for royalty but for the
constitutional monarchy as conceived by the Constituent Assembly.
The final chapter will discuss the Révolutions de Paris’s republican response to this
impasse. Referencing Antiquity, not only facilitated the de-legitimization of the constitutional
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monarchy, but also served to support Republican demands against the enemies of the popular
movement and their repressive apparatus. By examining the use of classical references to give
added legitimacy to the republican ideal, the final chapter will also deepen the analysis of that
second side of the Assembly’s loss of legitimacy, its rejection of popular sovereignty in action
and how the repression of republican ideas served only to better demonstrate their necessity.

63

Chapter Three
I.

Republicanism
So far this thesis has discussed the Republic and republicanism as if the definition of these

concepts were self-evident, or worse, as if they merely constituted an alternative to monarchy in
the form of a kingless régime. Now that the central question is that of the flowering of the
republican ideal in the pages of the Révolutions de Paris during the summer of 1791 and the role
that the reference to Antiquity played in justifying it, it is important to define more precisely what
republicanism meant to the journalists as to their readers. Defining republicanism is not as simple
as it might seem, however. In order to do so, this chapter will begin by looking at two movements
of political philosophy and their definitions of republicanism, that of the French Enlightenment
philosophers and that of classical republicanism. Despite the distinctions between them, these
movements did not function as discreet categories, but were in dialogue for the entirety of the
18th century. Patriot thought borrowed theoretical elements from both, but it is important to note
that patriots did not simply adopt the doctrines of any given theorist, but rather created syntheses
which adapted certain ideas and analyses to new revolutionary experiences. Moreover, one
should keep in mind that while this discussion temporarily puts natural rights philosophy aside in
order to provide a clear outline of republicanism before the Revolution, natural rights remain the
primordial element of the revolutionary republican synthesis.
Having some idea of the philosophes’ definition of the republic is crucial to understanding
how the revolutionary republican movement developed it. The notion that the French Revolution
is the Enlightenment’s “fault” is as old as the Revolution itself. While it would be naïve to think
that the philosophes really “caused” the Revolution, the influence of their ideas, but also of the
interpretative frameworks and their use of antiquity that they left to the revolutionaries is
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undeniable. The thinkers of the French Enlightenment were not the only influences on
revolutionary thought, and one would be wrong to limit any inquiry into its origins to the writings
of Montesquieu or Rousseau. However, because they were so widely known and oft-cited by
patriots, their definition(s) of republicanism are a good place to start.
For Montesquieu, as for the Encyclopédistes, the definition of a republic was a simple
question of form. According to Montesquieu’s De l’Esprit des lois, “There are three kinds of
governments; the REPUBLICAN, the MONARCHIST, and the DESPOTIC.” When sovereignty,
which is to say legislative power, is in the hands of multiple people, a state is a republic, whether
democratic, if the majority possesses this sovereignty, or aristocratic if a minority possesses it. In
both cases the executive power is in the hands of a “counsel or a senate.” Under the monarchy, a
single individual possesses the executive power, while an “intermediary body” makes the law. In
a despotic government, on the other hand, the executive and legislative powers are held by a
single individual, who thus has no check on his power.1
Although Montesquieu begins by dividing possible governments into three categories, the
difference between democracy and aristocracy proves just as important as that between republic
and monarchy or monarchy and despotism. The two kinds of republics are alike only in the
sharing of the legislative and executive powers among multiple people. One can consider then
that Montesquieu’s definition of the republic is none other than that which the Dictionary of the
Académie française gave already in 1694: “A state governed by many,” expanded to include the
question of sovereignty as well as governance. The entry “Republic” in the Encyclopédie is based
on Montesquieu, which suggests that his definition had wide currency among the philosophes.2
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The tradition of classical republicanism, on the other hand, which as its name implies,
began its development in Antiquity, but which continued to evolve in the writings of Renaissance
theorists such as Machiavelli, as well as those of English, then American and finally French
revolutionaries and their sympathizers, defines the republic differently. This tradition defines the
republic in terms of liberty. A republic is a “free state.” Classical republicans oppose liberty to
“slavery,” or rather domination, for that which makes a slave, even one with an absent or “easygoing” master, is the fact of being subject to that master’s arbitrary will. Liberty, by corollary,
consists in not being subject to another’s arbitrary will. It is the same with states. A free state, a
republic, or a “commonwealth” (which is essentially a translation of the Latin res publica) in the
17th century English texts, is a state where the citizens obey not the arbitrary will of individuals,
whether kings or elected magistrates, but laws which they have made themselves or through their
representatives. According to this theory, an individual or a people can only be free in this kind of
state, since any other would subject the people, individually and collectively, to another’s
arbitrary will.3
Rousseau and Mably, two philosophes often considered apart from the rest because their
writings frequently opposed those of the Encyclopédistes, had already begun to synthesize the
2012, <http://artflx.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/dicos/pubdico1look.pl?strippedhw=république>; Denis Diderot, Jean Le
Rond d’Alembert, et. al., Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers, Par une
société de gens de lettres, (Neufchâtel: Chez Samuel Faulche & Compagnie, 1765), s.v. “RÉPUBLIQUE,” t. 14, p.
150.
3
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“liberty as non-interference.” According to this theory, a slave with an absentee master would be considered free,
because no one is constraining his will, since the fact that he remains in his master’s power is relevant only as far as
his master uses that power to constrain him. For the classical republican, this state of being subject to another’s
arbitrary will is untenable, whether that will ever turns to constraint or not. On the other hand, a believer in liberty as
non-interference would view any law that constrains an individual’s choices as a diminishment of his liberty,
whereas if such a law were to be decided by the consent of the citizens of the state in which it was passed, for the
classical republican those citizens would retain their entire liberty by obeying it. It should be noted as well that
classical republicanism, when combined, as it began to be starting with the English Revolution, with natural rights
philosophy, demands that a law satisfy the further condition of respecting first the rights of the citizenry, and then, by
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French Enlightenment and classical republican definitions of the republic, while adding their own
reflections. Rousseau, like Montesquieu, describes in his Du contrat social, a tripartite division
between “simple” forms of government (which can then be combined in different permutations).
According to Rousseau, however, these are rather democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, and it is
those who govern who alone determine the difference, because whatever the form of the
government, sovereignty always belongs to the people. Thus, for Rousseau a “State governed by
many” is not a republic, but democracy. A republic, on the other hand, is “any State ruled by
laws, under whatever form of administration that may be: for then alone does public interest
govern, and then alone the chose publique [literal translation of the Latin res publica] is
something.”4 Rousseauist thought does not, then, abandon Montesquieu’s schemas entirely, but
its definition of the republic is that of classical republicanism, to the point of recalling the origin
of the word “republic.” Mably arrived at a similar definition of the republic, adding, however,
following Locke, that the ultimate goal of the republic is the preservation of the people’s natural
rights5. The patriots of the French Revolution would adopt a similar synthesis.
Nevertheless, there was often some confusion between the terms “republic” and
“democracy,” often used, in the Enlightenment and during the Revolution, as synonyms. Thus,
the article “Republic” of the Encyclopédie declares that “It is in the nature of a republic to have
but a small territory; without that it cannot long subsist. In a large republic there are large
fortunes, and consequently little moderation of spirit: there are responsibilities too great to place
in one citizen’s hands; interests particularize: a man feels first that he can be happy, great,
glorious, without his country; and soon, that he can be great alone upon the ruins of his country.”6
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Montesquieu and Rousseau agree on this point, if “democracy” is substituted for “republic.”
Virtue, defined as the love of the rule of law or of equality; moderation; the necessity of keeping
great disparities in fortune at bay, are all elements that the political theorists of the French
Enlightenment all consider necessary for the survival of “democracy,” but also for any “republic”
according to Mably and to a lesser degree Montesquieu.7 Despite the efforts of various theorists,
the distinction between “republic” and “democracy” was never sharp enough for a definition of
either that would satisfy everyone. Further complicating the picture, during the Revolution,
patriots like Robert professed to be both democrats and republicans, while giving these terms new
definitions shaped by but not copied from the philosophes.8
By the time of the Revolution, however, the theory that held that “republican”
government, understood, following Montesquieu’s definition, as a kingless government, would
be impossible in a large country like France was universally recognized, if not always accepted. It
is important to distinguish between the word “republic” and the idea behind it, since patriots were
calling for a state under the rule of law that would protect natural rights, close to Mably’s
definition of a republic, from the beginning of the Revolution, whether or not they used the term
“republic.” The pre-Varennes consensus among patriots, with a few notable exceptions, held to a
monarchy in which sovereignty no longer originated in the king but in the people, who would
elect deputies to the National Assembly, the legislative power, and of whose will the king would
become the executor, a simple agent of the people.9 As long as the Assembly respected the
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people’s sovereignty and the king did not regain any of his former prerogatives, the free state or
“republic” was not considered incompatible with this kind of monarchy.10 Patriots believed that
the “revolutions” of 1789, by which the Assembly was formed, privileges abolished, natural
rights declared, and so on, had created just such a republic. Accordingly, they founded their
critique of the Assembly’s policies of granting the king a suspensive veto, decreeing martial law,
or dividing the nation into active and passive citizens,11 on the understanding that these policies
violated the principals of this original revolutionary republic.
The movement calling explicitly for a republic as a regime not already in place,
differentiated itself, meanwhile, from the more general patriot orientation by calling for the
abolition of royalty in France. Starting in 1790, writers like Robert, who would become one of
the contributors to the Révolutions de Paris in July 1791, or Lavicomterie, author of Des peuples
et des rois and Les crimes des rois de France, began to espouse this kind of republicanism.
However, until the Varennes crisis, republican writings remained not abstract, since they take
great care to demonstrate how the republican model could be applied to France, but theoretical,
due to lack of support in public opinion.12 The Varennes crisis, which put the king’s status into
question and with it potentially the whole constitutional edifice, allowed this movement to
become more popular, despite the enduring hesitancies between this new kind of republicanism
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and the preservation of the monarchy, but with another king. The republic had nevertheless
become a popular demand.
The republican movement cannot, however, be reduced to the simple demand for an end
to the monarchy. It should rather be conceived as an outgrowth of the patriot orientation. As
described above, patriot thought was a sort of “republicanism” with a king as agent of the people,
and which does not generally describe itself explicitly as “republican.” Republicans espoused the
principles behind this kind of general patriot “republicanism,” but added to them the belief that
the kind of republic all patriots desire is incompatible with kingship. Moreover, for the republican
movement, the republic did not signify only the reign of laws, popular sovereignty, the guarantee
of natural rights, and the absence of a king at the head of the government. Republicanism adds
two more conditions: hatred for kings and the virtue of citizens. The “republics” of Sparta,
Athens, and especially Rome, served as models for that civic virtue as well as the execration of
kings, which has been considered an integral part of virtue since Antiquity.
Most of the references to Antiquity from the pages of the Révolutions de Paris that the
previous chapter examined operated on the register of analogy. This will remain the dominant
register in the examples analyzed in this chapter, but added to these will be examples showing the
influence of ancient models on reflections on the republic, democracy, citizenship, and how free
men – and women – act. As observed in the previous chapters, the use of ancient models of
republican virtue does not imply the adoption of ancient institutions, which are mentioned only
rarely. Antiquity, then, becomes a kind of symbol of civic virtue rather than a properly historical
reference.
Before turning to these examples, the Révolutions de Paris’s own definitions of the
republic bear examining. The journal defines the republic early in the summer of 1791 by
contrasting it with democracy in an article from the second issue after the king’s flight. The
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article responds to objections that those who were petitioning the Assembly regarding the fate of
the monarchy were attempting to seize the legislative power for themselves. According to the
journalist, this is impossible, for “The citizenry is not unaware that due to surface area and
population, pure democracy is impracticable in the French republic,” a declaration to which he
affixes a rather long note.
It is worthwhile to cite this note in extenso, for it defines the republic as the Révolutions
de Paris understood it during the Varennes Crisis:
Many people are going to think that there is a contradiction in these words: pure
democracy is impracticable in the French republic, because the republic has often
been confused with democracy: but all contradictions disappear once one attends
to the fact that democracy is that sort of government where the people, assembled
in person, make their laws themselves, while the republic is the government of a
people who know how to have a senate declare and execute their will, under
reserve of the nation’s veto. A small state like Geneva, for example, can govern
itself in a purely democratic manner, because all Genevans can gather in the same
place and hear each other; but it is physically impossible for 25 million men,
spread out over a large surface area, to gather together and deliberate in the same
enclosure or on the same plain.13
One should observe first that the journalist does not adopt wholesale any of the definitions just
examined of the republic. Democracy is not, as it is for Montesquieu, a subcategory of the
republic, but a distinct entity. This distinction allows the journalist to admit the inapplicability of
democracy to France, while still maintaining the idea of the republic.
The republic, in turn, becomes a kind of hybrid of the definitions of Montesquieu, Mably
and Rousseau and of ideas emerging from the experience of the revolution itself. The journalist,
like all patriots, refuses the possibility of an aristocratic republic of the kind theorized by
Montesquieu. The Assembly had already established this kind of aristocratic republic, where a
minority is sovereign, by turning “active” citizens into a kind of “aristocracy of the rich.” Patriots
like the contributors to the Révolutions de Paris firmly denounced not only traditional
13
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aristocracy, but also this decree. They held that sovereignty must belong to the people in their
entirety, as in Montesquieu’s democracy or in every society according to Rousseau and Mably.
However, in the above note the Révolutions de Paris elaborates a new theory of
representation, developed in the course of the Revolution itself and shared by most patriots. With
this theory, this article resolves a problem posed by Rousseau, that of the abdication of
sovereignty. The journalist alludes in the main text of the article to Rousseau’s objection to
representation. Summarizing one of the arguments of adversaries of the right of petition, he
writes: “but a great man [Rousseau] said that the freest people [the English] were only free at the
moment of elections.”14 Indeed, the “great man” had denied that the English political system
could be rightly considered free, because the King-in-Parliament usurps popular sovereignty,
which returns in part to the people only during elections. The journalist responds to this objection
by espousing another model of representation, according to which the people never abandon their
sovereignty. The “senate” or National Assembly is not autonomous, for its decrees are placed
“under reserve of the nation’s veto.” The people do not delegate the Assembly to will in their
place, but to transmit the people’s will and execute it: hence, the importance of making public
opinion known to the Assembly by way of petition.
Thus, to the extent that the republic that the Révolutions de Paris advocates is a new
entity, formed from revolutionary experience as much as by anterior texts, it cannot therefore
correspond entirely to the republics of the philosophes or a fortiori to ancient republics. Natural
rights, universalism, representation of any kind were all unknown to the Greeks and Romans, yet
they are fundamental to the revolutionary republican movement’s definition of the republic. What
then is the use of the reference to Antiquity in the legitimization of republicanism? The response
to this question comes back to that other aspect of republicanism: a certain ethos of citizenship
14
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designated by the term civic virtue. In defense of Brune, accused in the course of the repression
following the Champ-de-Mars Massacre of having “made speeches announcing a spirit of
sedition” and, in the Révolutions de Paris’s terms, of “having preached republicanism,” the
journalist declares: “it is impossible, metaphysically impossible, for all true republicans not to be
excellent citizens; they are only that, they can only be that, the republic is everything to them.”15
This notion that republicanism consists in a heroic devotion to the republic originated in
Antiquity, but would be fundamental to both the Enlightenment and the French Revolution’s
conception of the republic. Already, when Montesquieu wrote of the mainspring of the republic,
he turned to Antiquity: “Greek politicians, who lived in a popular government, recognized no
other force that could support it but that of virtue.” And Montesquieu endeavors to prove this
belief right:
Athens had within it the same strength when it dominated with so much glory, and
when it served with so much shame. It had twenty thousand citizens (2) when it
defended the Greeks against the Persians […]. When Philip dared to dominate in
Greece, when he appeared at the gates of Athens (4), it had as yet only lost the
times. One can see in Demosthenes what pains it took to awaken it: they feared
Philip there not as the enemy of liberty but of their pleasures (5). That city, which
had resisted so many defeats, which had been seen to be reborn after destructions,
was vanquished at Chaeronea, and forever. […] It was always as easy to triumph
over Athens’ strength as it was difficult to triumph over its virtue.16
As Montesquieu demonstrates here, the dialectic between the necessity of virtue and the fear of
losing it is at the heart of the idea of the republic as theorized in the 18th century. Without virtue,
the republic falls apart, because every individual puts his private interests above the public
interest, and thus divided the republic falls prey to conquerors from abroad or internal greed and
ambition. The larger and wealthier a country, moreover, the more difficult it is to preserve virtue,
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for the more private interests have, the more they want.17 Indeed, this is one reason why
Montesquieu, among others, preferred the supposed stability of the monarchy to a republic’s
precarious dependence upon virtue. Equally important, if virtue is exemplified by certain heroic
figures, it is more fundamentally associated with the people. Once a people’s virtue is lost, all the
virtue, all the skill of a given individual, even of a Demosthenes, cannot bring that people back
from the precipice.
Antiquity is of course, as mentioned, not merely an example to illustrate this idea, but is
also at its origin. Take for example the citation of Tacitus at the beginning of the article
“Republic” on the Encyclopédie: “Reipublicoe [sic] forma laudari faciliùs [sic] quàm [sic]
evenire & si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest [It is easier to praise the republican form than for it
to come about, and if it comes about, it cannot at all be for long], says Tacitus, annal. 4.”18 The
patriots of the Revolution cannot share this pessimism, which imagines the loss of virtue to be
inevitable, in every regard. The gaze of those who believe themselves at the beginning of a new
era, infused with an Enlightenment belief in progress, cannot be that of an author, writing under
the Roman Empire, but nostalgic for Rome’s republican past. For most patriots, moreover, virtue
emanates naturally from the people, who can be deceived but not easily corrupted, and this virtue
acts as a safeguard against the decline of the republic.
Nevertheless, this pessimistic perspective on the republic permeates the terms and notions
that patriots had at their disposal to make sense of the events they were observing. Thus, this
perspective forms a rubric to categorize and explain the often despairing response to the repeated
betrayals of the summer of 1791, which do not exist in a vacuum, but which take place and are
understood within this mental universe.
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The theme of the necessity of republican virtue and the fear of losing it would thus remain
at the heart of efforts to legitimize the republic, especially in the choice of examples from
Antiquity. The Révolutions de Paris did not respond directly to Montesquieu’s intimation that the
republic’s dependence on virtue makes it fragile during the Varennes Crisis. The journal’s choice
of classical examples of republican virtue indicates that it was not stability that its contributors
sought to find in the republic. Among the most prominent of these were, after all, Marcus Brutus
and Cato the Younger, who both failed to preserve the Roman Republic, yet who were generally
admired for their virtue at the end of the 18th century. The republic needs virtue to survive,
certainly, but even when the virtue of a few individuals is unsuccessful in preserving the republic,
their heroic self-sacrifice become a point in republicanism’s favor. No one would look for such
heroism under the monarchy.
What the republic that the Révolutions de Paris and other revolutionary republicans
advocated potentially lost in stability, it made up in its unique capacity to preserve natural rights.
If the French Revolution could be said to have a single, fundamental ideology, the philosophy of
natural rights would be it. The French Revolution did not invent it, but neither did Antiquity. The
Ancient Greeks and Romans had the notion that citizens had certain prerogatives, but they were
neither innate nor universal. The concept of natural rights first began to emerge in the legal
writings of the 12th century. From the 12th to the 18th centuries writers, philosophers and
revolutionaries continued to develop the idea, theorizing it in conjunction with republicanism.
This vast, multi-secular debate culminated during the French Revolution with the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen.19
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The Declaration includes individual and collective rights like freedom of speech and the
press, assembly, and religion, but it also includes the right to participate, directly or through one’s
representatives, in the legislative power. This last right, that of political participation, is
fundamental because it allows for the preservation of all the others. Political participation, then, is
a right, but not an end in itself. One is a “citizen” primarily to protect one’s rights as a “man.”20
Whether or not Constant was correct in asserting that political participation was an end in itself in
Antiquity, it is evident that political participation in ancient societies that had not discovered
natural rights cannot have had the same character as in revolutionary France. However, virtue
proved as useful and necessary to preserving universal natural rights as to conserving the
privileges of a citizen élite. If Revolutionary France can be said to have imitated anything from
Antiquity, it is surely the concept of virtue. Yet, even then, it would be more accurate to say that
patriots adapted this ancient concept of virtue, harnessing it for their own ends.

II.

Models of Republican Virtue
In the pages of the Révolutions de Paris, the reference to classic models of virtue serves a

dual purpose, legitimizing the republic by comparing modern patriots to widely admired heroes
from Antiquity, and inspiring its readers to emulate the virtue of ancient and modern exemplars
alike. However, the history of Ancient Greece and Rome provided patriots with examples that
invited despair at the inexorable onslaught of despotism as much as hope for a republican future,
by allowing them to associate both of these ideas with virtuous figures from that history.
The suicides of Cato the Younger and Marcus Brutus, figures of republican virtue par
excellence, gave an example to follow if ever liberty were to be suppressed, for once gone, it was
20
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considered lost forever. Commenting on the contemporary suicide of Provant, “lieutenant of the
gunners of the battalion of Saint-Nicolas [of the National Guard], and member of the Cordeliers
Club,” the Révolutions de Paris refer to him as a “modern Cato.” Provant killed himself, the
journal reports, because he was “profoundly afflicted by the Champ de Mars Massacre,” and his
justification was in his last words: “I swore to die free, liberty is lost, I die.” Cato the Younger
committed suicide after his defeat by Julius Caesar, who, as explored in the previous chapter, was
incontestably a tyrant to the contributors to the Révolutions de Paris as well as to their readers.
The parallel is not exact, since Provant did not suffer any personal defeat, but this is less
important to the journalist than the idea of suicide as an appropriate response to the loss of
liberty. The journalist’s admiring reaction to this suicide through the reference to Cato supports
the long-standing thesis that Antiquity provided an alternative to a Christian perspective.
Catholicism, the predominant mode of Christianity in France, regards suicide as a mortal sin. Yet
the Romans considered that in certain circumstances it was the only honorable course of action.
Moreover, the Révolutions de Paris in particular adopted a resolutely anticlerical, if not always
antichristian stance on numerous occasions. It comes as no surprise then, that the journal would
adopt this alternative model, especially when it can be linked to the republican virtue which Cato
the Younger has embodied for many since Antiquity itself.
The journal never evokes Brutus’s suicide as directly, but both the regular contributors
and Camille Desmoulins, in what one might consider a “guest column,” allude to the last words
that the Greek biographer Plutarch (c. 46-c. 125 CE) attributes to him. The quote comes early in
the period for the regular contributors, in issue 101, which is to say before the king’s flight. In
this less tense context, the journal is able to express it in the conditional, thus injecting some
optimism into the otherwise defeatist sentiment. Moreover, the Révolutions de Paris modifies the
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quote from “O virtue, you are but a vain name!” to “O liberty! You are but a vain name,” what is
more only “if we are still the slaves of rank and privilege.”21
One might be tempted to see in this paraphrase a purely rhetorical borrowing. The
circumstances are not the same. The Revolution has not been defeated like Brutus at the Battle of
Philippi, and so the sentiment expressed cannot be the same either. When Plutarch has Brutus
doubt virtue, he is thereby questioning all his actions from the assassination of Caesar onward,
concluding at last that they were futile against fate. The liberty that the Révolutions de Paris
evokes is not a “vain name” in the same absolute sense as virtue is for Brutus. Rather, it is “vain”
in the sense that one can declare oneself free and not enjoy the reality of freedom. However,
oblique though this reference to Brutus may be, it is enough for the journal to invoke him for its
argument to benefit from association with his reputation for republican virtue. By paraphrasing
Brutus, the journal can speak symbolically with his voice.
Camille Desmoulins’ allusion, which comes, on the other hand, in the middle of the
repression unleashed by the Champ de Mars Massacre, refers explicitly to Brutus. Desmoulins
gives over to despair more fully than the regular contributors to the Révolutions de Paris ever do,
to the point of entirely losing confidence in the people. It is true that Desmoulins, unlike the
regular contributors, did have a warrant out for his arrest.22 In an article filled with a number of
references to Antiquity as well as to the English Revolution, he wrote:
Let us not await the coming betrayal of the battle of Philippi to recognize this
overwhelming truth and cry out with Brutus, in perishing: virtue, homeland
[patrie], liberty, equality, you are but phantoms, and heaven made the people for
tyrants, as it made insects to be food for birds! I despise that imbecilic people too
much to expose myself further to hanging for them and to amuse their frivolity by
the spectacle of my execution, which they would perhaps applaud.23
21
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Like the ordinary contributors, Desmoulins modifies the original quote. However, the deeper
meaning is retained. It is difficult to say whether this display of despair would have reached its
logical conclusion: whether Desmoulins really believed that he was on the point of being dragged
off to execution or whether he was really contemplating suicide. It seems more likely that this
flight of lyricism is designed to emphasize to the reader the depth of his disappointment.
Even so, this radical rejection of a people who have supposed abandoned virtue to return
to their primitive state of frivolity represents the crossing of a significant boundary. The French
people were had often been portrayed as frivolous under the Ancien Régime, but a major tenet of
patriot philosophy held that the Revolution had regenerated the people. Since 1789, virtue resided
in them. The importance of the people’s virtue to patriots makes the implications of Desmoulins’
reference serious indeed. If the king or even the Assembly were without virtue, some hope might
still remain, but if the people themselves abandoned virtue, the Revolution would be done for.
The Révolutions de Paris did despair of the constituted powers, but if the people’s ignorance
sometimes discouraged its contributors, they insisted that the people had merely been deceived,
not corrupted. The journal in general never reached the same depths of despair as Desmoulins
because it remained hopeful that the republican movement would be able to undeceive the people
and bring them back to the principles of the Revolution.
As established above, Enlightenment, republican and revolutionary thought all establish a
close relationship between republicanism and virtue, but there is another dimension to this virtue
that this this has not yet discussed, that of the dignity that belongs to virtuous citizens. Because
these concepts of republicanism, citizenship, virtue, and dignity are linked, an affront to
republicanism could be considered an outrage against the dignity of virtuous citizens. The
Révolutions de Paris cites the founder of the Roman Republic Lucius Brutus’s response to his
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enemy Aruns, son of the last king of Rome, from Voltaire’s play “Brutus” in order to defend that
dignity from those who accused republicans of wanting to bring about “anarchy”: “….Stop, know
that one must name / The citizens of Rome with more respect.”24 It will be recalled that for the
Révolutions de Paris, republicans are by definition the best citizens. Thus, to insult republicans is
to insult the citizenry in its most virtuous component. The quote is not contextualized, perhaps
because the reader is supposed to recognize it. “Rome” functions however, whether one knows
Voltaire’s play or not, first by analogy with France, but then too because it represents the
republic, in its form as an ideal toward which patriots bore their allegiance.
It matters little that the reference to Antiquity comes in this case through Voltaire’s play.
All classical references are mediated by the interpretations and uses of more recent texts, whether
implicitly or explicitly. One might even wonder whether the popularity of figures like the two
Bruti would have been as great during the Revolution if not for Voltaire’s plays about them.
Elsewhere the Révolutions de Paris considers it possible to measure the virtue of the public based
on whether they applaud the “proud accents of liberty that come out of Brutus’ mouth” in
Voltaire’s plays or whether they respond to Racine’s “Athalie” with “servile bravos.”25
More importantly, perhaps, Voltaire was a figure of consensus among revolutionaries in
general. The National Assembly itself voted that Voltaire’s remains would be transferred to the
newly consecrated Panthéon and the ceremony took place right in the middle of the Varennes
Crisis. By citing Voltaire, the Révolutions de Paris were able to profit from the double
legitimizing power of the figure of Brutus and of the philosophe who made the two Bruti the
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protagonists of his plays.26 In this case in particular, Voltaire’s verse finds a way to express the
emphasis on the dignity of the citizen which is at the heart of classical republicanism. The
Révolutions de Paris’s reprise of the quote suggests that even as they recognized the importance
of the “man” beside that of the “citizen,” in order to define the nature of citizenship itself, they
continued to turn to the classical republican tradition.
This recognition of the dignity of the citizen in the republic does not imply, however, that
citizens need no encouragement. Just as the Declaration of Rights continually reminds citizens of
their rights (and, by corollary, of their duties), so must one also remind them of their dignity by
giving them examples of virtue and encouraging them to aspire to them. To that end the
Révolutions de Paris cites a letter by a certain “M. de Chaumareys, former [ci-devant] gentleman
of the Limousin”: “Avida est periculi virtus…, says Seneca. Are there still enough virtues among
us for us to be eager for dangers [avides de périls], for us to want to expose ourselves to them, in
order to assure a great good to our posterity?”27 Seneca’s wisdom is not doubted, or rather, as
elsewhere, he is cited because the one citing him already agrees with him, and can use his widely
accepted status as a wise philosopher and victim of Nero’s tyranny to legitimize his own ideas.28
One can assume then that this “former gentleman of the Limousin” and by extension the journal
that cites him, since the Révolutions de Paris did not publish letters with which its contributors
did not agree without commentary, did indeed agree that virtue is “eager for dangers.” One might
wonder why, however.
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In fact, this notion that “virtue is eager for dangers” is yet another persistent topos of the
republican tradition. This tradition continued to use many of the same examples of heroic virtue
as would have been known to Seneca to personify republicanism. The Révolutions de Paris itself
provides evidence of this phenomenon, as discussed in this chapter. The most virtuous of the
ancient heroes are those who faced, and frequently succumbed to, dangers. The quote from
Seneca sums up this tendency and turns it into a prescription: to be virtuous, one must seek those
perils, presumably to prove oneself.
This citation extends the idea of a shared culture in the reference to Antiquity from a
contemporary shared culture to one for all time. Even more importantly, it creates the illusion that
the interpretation of that culture has also been shared through the ages. This fact alone reinforces
the legitimacy of that interpretation, for an idea which continues to be considered obvious
seventeen hundred years after its first recording carries a certain authority in and of itself. Thus,
adherence to Seneca’s words lends weight to the exhortation to take risks for the republic by
implying the necessary link between willingness to confront danger and virtue to be an eternal
truth.
Aside from the references to the two Bruti, the founder of the republic and the
tyrannicide, the most commonly used classical models of virtue were Cato the Younger, and the
Greek legislators Lycurgus and Solon. Cato is referenced not only in the context of his suicide,
but also for his reputation for inflexible republicanism throughout his life. The Révolutions de
Paris associates Cato most often with Brutus as symbols of virtue, since they were both
adversaries of Julius Caesar, but there are also allusions specific to the former. Upon the closing
of the Constituent Assembly, the Révolutions de Paris reports on the work of that body by
contrasting its corrupt majority with the deputies of the patriot left: “Pétion, Robespierre and the
small group of their fellows, never ceased to embarrass their adversaries, so powerful in number
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and means: more than once their presence recalled that of Cato at the licentious spectacles of
Rome.”29 This passage recalls an incident reported by 1st century CE Roman author Valerius
Maximus. According to this author the mere presence of Cato, known for his exemplary morality,
interrupted the normal course of a spectacle – apparently a kind of nude pantomime – at the
Floralia, until he consented to leave the theatre.30 The journalist, making an analogy between
“good mores” and republican virtue, then between “debauchery” and corruption, compares this
scene to that of the patriots of the Assembly putting the corrupt “moderate” majority to shame, by
their virtuous presence.
The perspective the journalist opens onto Antiquity in this passage is not without
ambiguity. First, it reveals the equivocal relationship between private morality and public virtue
defined as love of one’s country, the rule of law, and equality, which was present in the classical
republican tradition from Antiquity onward; “licentiousness” is not literally equated with
corruption, but the traditional association between the two might suggest as much to the reader.
Next, the reference paints a dual picture of Antiquity. On the one hand there is the virtuous Cato,
but his “good mores” are only brought into focus by the decadence of late Republican Rome in
general. Indeed, by this parallel, the journalist suggests to the reader that the state of France at the
beginning of autumn 1791 resembled the failing Roman Republic. Despite his wish to recognize
the left-wing deputies’ fidelity to principle, the most important message he conveys by this
reference is that of the precarious situation of the “republic,” in the primitive sense of “res
publica,” in France.
Among the few Greek figures cited, Lycurgus and Solon were held in particular esteem.
Exemplary of the figure of the wise legislator, their virtue could serve as a model for French
29
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legislators, although the law codes attributed to them were less democratic than the patriot
ideal.31 As in the case of Cato “at the licentious spectacles of Rome,” the Révolutions de Paris
used the example of their virtue and wisdom to highlight the insufficiency of these qualities in the
Constituent Assembly. In an article whose title, “Thanksgiving on the happy departure of the
constituent body,” sets the tone well, the journalist speculates: “In the circumstances in which we
placed you [the deputies to the Constituent Assembly], what would not Lycurgus, Solon,
Confucius, Lhôpital, have done! How well they would have taken advantage of them!”32 The
journalist emphasizes the lost opportunity: the Assembly was not up to the task of bringing a
constitution in accordance with the Declaration of Rights to fruition.
Once more, the way to wound the Assembly’s reputation is to contest its legitimacy next
to universally recognized symbols of virtue, in this case of those recognized as architects of wise
constitutions. The detail of these constitutions mattered far less than their reputation. As often
happens, too, the journal associates figures foreign to Greco-Roman Antiquity with the Spartan
Lycurgus and the Athenian Solon, suggesting that all four are cited for their reputation for virtue
and wisdom, which gives them legitimizing power, whatever civilization they belonged to.
When the Révolutions de Paris addresses the new Legislative Assembly while invoking
Solon and Lycurgus, on the other hand, these figures lend legitimacy to the ideas the journal
suggests, rather than highlighting faults the Assembly has had no time as yet to commit. Even so,
the reference returns to the theme of the insufficiency of the Assembly to succeed at the task
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before it. Thus, the journalist seems to wish that the allusion could put a break on the Assembly’s
potential arrogance:
Rome sent forth to Athens and all Greece to consult the code of the Solons and the
Lycurguses. The National Assembly of France will invite all the political writers
[publicistes] of the universe to communicate to it the results of their learned
reflections. We want, we tell ourselves, that our constitution should one day serve
as a model for all peoples; this idea is lovely, but we will never realize it if France,
if the senate especially, relies on its own lights: it would perhaps be necessary, for
the progress of universal happiness, and particularly for the happiness of France,
for the next National Assembly to pass a solemn decree inviting scholars of all
nations to each send it a draft of a civil and criminal code, in addition to their
views on the constitution.33
The idea is not without precedent in the Enlightenment; Rousseau and Mably had both presented
drafts of constitutions for Corsica and Poland. In fact, this idea of an appeal to the “lights” of the
“universe” is at least as much a part of an 18th century as an ancient mentality. The Roman
legislator Numa was said to have visited Greece before drafting the primitive Roman
constitution, as the journal alludes to here, and Lycurgus was said to have voyaged to Crete and
Egypt, but all these legislators are quasi-mythical figures.
It is curious that the journal would prefer their support to that of more recent “legislators”
like Rousseau or Mably, who were often also used as legitimizing figures, in the pages of the
Révolutions de Paris and elsewhere. Yet the ancient legislators win out here. This was likely due
to the mythos of the “golden age” of Greece and Rome that their laws supposedly established.
Even if this narrative does not fit with history in detail, it had become axiomatic and this
perception is more important than the reality.34 Rousseau or Mably’s constitutions, on the other
hand, were less suitable models, having never been adopted. Even so, it is significant that the
model that Antiquity provides here is that of the action of profiting from the wisdom of other
civilizations. The Révolutions de Paris does not call for the Assembly to look to Solon or
33
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Lycurgus’s constitutions alongside Numa, but to do the modern equivalent, by seeking the advice
of contemporary political theorists. Antiquity may well give more weight to an idea than Mably
or Rousseau, but in fact, the model the journal is proposing is closer to theirs.
Other figures, such as Epictetus, Aristides, Cincinnatus or Horace, were recognized as
examples of republican virtue, or at least, in Horace’s case, of the republican nostalgia of an
imperial poet. None of these figures commanded the same attention as Cato or either Brutus,
however, and the Révolutions de Paris cites each of them only once or twice during the summer
of 1791. This preference for allusions to a few key figures can be attributed to the journal’s need
to find the most significant references for its audience. Prudhomme and his collaborators liked, it
would seem, to show off their erudition, but they aimed first and foremost to convince their
readers. Thus they prioritized the most widely known references. Figures like Brutus or Cato,
who had been popularized over the course of the 18th century in paintings and plays, served the
journalists’ aims better than more obscure references, even if they do not entirely reject these.
This kind of use of allusions (to Antiquity or otherwise), contrasts starkly with that of
Camille Desmoulins. Desmoulins makes many more references and explains each one less.
Despite his republican and democratic opinions, readers of his journal who had not received a
classical education would likely be unable to follow his arguments, which often depend upon an
understanding of the numerous references. The Révolutions de Paris, on the other hand, uses
references to reinforce and legitimize arguments, but it is rare for the meaning of an article to
depend on them. Moreover, when the Révolutions de Paris makes a reference it is often explained
and, as previously noted, the journal almost always translates Latin citations into the vernacular,
which suggests a desire to democratize its readership. Rousseau and Mably themselves, among
the most democratically inclined Enlightenment authors, did not go so far.
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Thus, when the Révolutions de Paris invoked virtuous figures from Antiquity, the journal
was seeking universally recognizable symbols of republican virtue, in order to legitimize its
ideas. This kind of allusion has its limits, however. It cannot easily support republicanism as a
kingless form of government in particular, because it does not refer to republican, or
antimonarchical, institutions. Certain referents, like Lycurgus, even contradict the
antimonarchical conception of republicanism, since the government he was said to have
established included two kings. The association between the republic and virtue as a
characteristic to be admired and emulated remained intact, therefore, but within the framework of
a kind of natural rights infused classical republicanism. As discussed above, this kind of
republicanism embraced all patriots, those who called themselves republicans, but also those who
still hesitated before the abolition of the monarchy.

III.

Tyrannicide
Allusions to tyrannicide constitute an important subset of the reference to Antiquity as

model of virtue. One cannot speak of references to Antiquity in the Révolutions de Paris without
discussing the campaign in favor of tyrannicide that Sylvain Maréchal led using the journal as a
mouthpiece starting in December 1790.35 As Monique Cottret’s study Tuer le tyran ?
demonstrates, the notion of tyrannicide underwent many permutations between the Renaissance
and the French Revolution, to say nothing of Antiquity or the Middle Ages. The concepts of
tyrant and tyrannicide evolved to a much greater extent than that of virtue. It is impossible
therefore to find a direct filiation between ancient and revolutionary ideas of tyrannicide.
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Revolutionary appreciations of tyrannicide are necessarily influenced by more recent tyrannicides
and the discourse which surrounds them.
However, the changes in meaning and adaptations of the ideas of tyranny and tyrannicide
did not prevent patriots from using Antique models to legitimize their own particular brand of
tyrannicide. Cottret observes that there were two major models for tyrannicide during the Early
Modern Period: Judith, biblical assassin of the Babylonian general Holofernes, and Brutus,
assassin of Julius Caesar. Despite the evolution of the theory of tyrannicide, the Revolution
embraced the latter, so thoroughly in fact that Cottret calls the chapter of her book discussing the
Revolution “La generation des Brutus” or “The generation of the Bruti.”36 In this way, the
reference to Antiquity remained fundamental to tyrannicide and its justification during the
Revolution, even though, much like with the republic or the notion of virtue, revolutionaries no
longer conceived of it in the same way as the Greeks or Romans.
The definition of tyrant expanded considerably over the course of the Early Modern
Period. At its origins in Ancient Greece, tyranny was simply the illegitimate acquisition of power,
whether used for good or ill. Though it did not take long for the Greeks and Romans to attribute
negative connotations to the term, it continued to be identified with usurpation until the
Renaissance. In the 16th and 17th centuries, “legitimate” monarchs who persecuted subjects of the
“true” religion, (according to the “Monarchomachs” of the Reformation), or who did not follow
the “fundamental laws of the kingdom,” secular and religious (to summarize the perspective of
the English regicides), could also be considered tyrants.37
This evolution would culminate with the French Revolution by a return to the original
theme of usurpation, this time that of the people’s sovereignty. After the fall of the monarchy on
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10 August 1792, most republicans considered that there could be no such thing as a “legitimate”
monarch. “Every king is a rebel and a usurper,” as Saint-Just would conclude in his speech of 13
November 1792 advocating the former king’s execution.38 The idea of the king as usurper of the
people’s sovereignty adopts the classical definition of tyranny as usurpation, yet also marks the
culmination of Early Modern theories of tyranny. These constrained a monarch’s power within
bounds more fundamental than positive law. In this case, those bounds are those of a people’s
natural and inalienable right to their sovereignty.
That point had not yet been reached when Sylvain Maréchal first appealed in December
1790 for the creation of a “sacred legion of tyrannicides.” At this moment in the Revolution,
tyrannicide is a pure export threatening “all the disturbers [perturbateurs] of the human race
ready to swoop down on us” but not Louis XVI. Maréchal vigorously denies the possibility that
his theory of tyrannicide could apply to the king: “This monarch [Louis XVI] is of the very small
number of those who would reconcile a Brutus with royalty. A king who lets the nation’s liberty
sit beside him on the throne deserves all of the nation’s attachment. The people’s tranquility
depends on the existence of such a king.”39 The king remains unassailable.
After Varennes, the idea of a legion of tyrannicides whose blows would theoretically not
be directed at Louis XVI, remained current. The Révolutions de Paris gave an account of a
tyrannicidal oath taken by the Cordeliers, in the same article that recounts the king’s flight. While
the Assembly was giving itself over to the fiction of the king’s kidnapping,
the Cordeliers Club, against which all the traitors roar, was truly occupying itself
with the public good [chose publique]: they also took a terrible oath, the same that
saved Rome from Porsena’s armies: ‘The Free Frenchmen (as this club’s decree
has it) composing the Society of the Rights of Man and Citizen declare to their
fellow citizens that this society contains within it as many tyrannicides as
38
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members, who have all sworn individually to go and stab to death the tyrants who
would dare to attack our borders or make an attempt on our liberty in any
manner.’40
The text of the Cordelier oath is ambiguous, but the emphasis remains on foreign enemies. The
Révolutions de Paris presented this oath favorably, but the journal specified in its comments on it
that “The tyrants who have it in for our liberty are not all outside our borders; the most dangerous
are among us.” This remark is even more ambiguous: do these tyrants “among us” include the
king? At this juncture, the journal does not specify.
The allusion to Porsena, the only classical figure other than Marcus Brutus and Caesar’s
other assassins that the Révolutions de Paris references during the summer of 1791, embodies
this ambiguity.41 This allusion refers to an incident reported by the early imperial historian Livy
from the beginnings of the Roman Republic. Allied with Tarquin the Proud, last king of Rome,
who had been expelled to make way for the Republic, Etruscan king Lars Porsena was besieging
the city of Rome. Caius Mucius attempted to assassinate him. Apprehended, he held his hand in
an open flame in order to show his courage, earning him the nickname Scaevola, or “lefthanded.” He further claimed that he was one of three hundred young Romans who had all sworn
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Porsena’s death. According to Livy, this incident convinced Porsena to make peace with the
Romans.42
The choice to associate Porsena with the Cordelier oath shows that despite the journalist
(likely Maréchal)’s insistence that “the most dangerous enemies are among us,” tyrannicide
remained oriented outward, since Porsena, while perhaps a tyrant, was first and foremost an
enemy. However, as observed in the previous chapter, the journal compared Louis to Tarquin,
Porsena’s ally, in the very same issue. The approbation of an attempt on Porsena’s life can only
return against Tarquin-Louis. It should be noted as well that Livy presents the oath of the three
hundred young Romans as a simple boast of Scaevola’s, suggesting that it probably never took
place. The journalist does not concern himself with this probability, for it was the fear of the oath
and not its reality that was at the origin of the peace concluded between Rome and Porsena.
Likewise, though the Cordelier oath did take place, the article suggests that it is less important for
them to be ready to literally assassinate a tyrant than to make tyrants fear them. Consequently, the
journalist ends by noting that “following the Cordelier oath,” tyrants “must sleep no longer.” It is
less a question, in this circumstance, of killing the tyrant than of making him fear tyrannicide, and
why, the article seems to ask, would a bluff that worked for the Romans not work for us?
The other allusions to tyrannicide, which all refer to the assassination of Julius Caesar,
while always approving, encouraged imitation of this action to an even lesser extent. Indeed, the
demand for a popular referendum and criminal judgment to decide the fate of Louis XVI, reveal a
desire to remain within legal channels. The Révolutions de Paris invoked Caesar’s assassins as
models of a salutary hatred of tyrants, but not to push readers to imitate their specific actions.
Thus, they appeared in a discussion regarding the guard that the Assembly was proposing to
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assign to the king. The author of the article feared to see the king “surrounded by eighteen
hundred lictors,” which would leave him “sovereign master and despot” like figures from Roman
history associated with despotism who would have been similarly attended. However, he could
not help but rejoice to think that the National Guard would no longer be forced to guard the king.
The article exclaims: “Brutus, Cassius and Cimber were just as good as three Frenchmen; could
the entire republic have convinced them to guard Caesar?” The tyrannicides are identified with
French citizens in their hatred of tyrants, but the journal keeps silent on the act of tyrannicide
itself.
In the end, tyrannicide as an extra-legal act, individual or conspiratorial, never enjoyed
great success among republicans or patriots in general. Many patriots disapproved of Sylvain
Maréchal’s campaign in favor of tyrannicide. Just as significantly, the campaign itself was
characterized by its public and regularly organized nature, as opposed to the elements of
conspiracy and individual initiative present in the ancient examples. It is not abusive to say that
Maréchal’s version of tyrannicide is symptomatic of a more general preference among French
revolutionaries for acting in the open. This preference was likely rooted both in a concern for
what would be called transparency today, and also in the hopes that, after having turned toward
Antiquity to find models of virtue, the revolutionaries might themselves serve as models for the
“universe” and posterity.

IV.

Does the French Revolution Need Antiquity?
As the end of this inquiry approaches, it becomes necessary to leave off the analysis of the

function of classical references to consider why the revolutionaries, or at least the republican
patriots who contributed to the Révolutions de Paris, believed them necessary, or, to go further,
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whether they could have done without them. It happens that two articles in particular from the
Révolutions de Paris, one from before the king’s flight, the other from after the Champ de Mars
massacre, allow, in different ways, a potential insight into the response that the contributors to
this journal themselves gave to those questions. The first of these articles is entitled simply
“VOLTAIRE.” and covers the projected entry of the titular philosophe into the newly
consecrated Panthéon. This article offers some of the only examples from the corpus examined in
this thesis, of a desire to imitate ancient institutions. In this case, the journalist proposes to follow
the Athenian and Roman example of lining the “great roads” around the capital, as well as the
Champs-Élysées, with tombs. Even here, however, the principal motive for this recommendation
is the Rousseauist sentiment that by erecting tombs outdoors, society would more closely
approximate nature.43
At the same time, the journalist’s proposition also implied a clear preference for the
antique, which he felt obliged to justify. This justification is one of the more interesting pieces of
evidence for this thesis. The journalist, taking the idea of the Panthéon for an imitation of English
Westminster Abbey, proposes to substitute the antique model for the English model, but in a
particular fashion: “If the French, having become the premier people of the world by the eternal
Declaration of the Rights of Man, which they proclaimed first in almost all its purity, consent to
being copyists, let them rather copy the Greeks.”44 The language is emphatic: thanks to the
Declaration of Rights, the French have surpassed all other peoples, including the Greeks. The
Greeks remain superior to the English and it remains possible for the French to profit from the
example of their virtue or their institutions, but it is no less true that without the concept of
natural rights, ancient peoples cannot rival Revolutionary France.
43
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Further on, the article becomes even more explicit: “But why would we not, we who have
almost perfected the theory of national liberty, of which the Greeks and Romans, happier than us,
had, so to speak, only the sentiment, why would we not also have our own ideas regarding the
respects to be paid to those of our fellow citizens worthy of honorable memory?”45 Here the
journalist goes behind his original idea. If ancient institutions deserve consideration,
Revolutionary France, with its recognition of the rights of man and citizen can assuredly do
better. This assertion of France’s superiority cannot exactly be called chauvinism, for France is
only superior as long as it continues to preserve natural rights. Other peoples can join the French
people on this summit of “perfection” – such is indeed the dearest wish of French patriots – and
France can fall from it.
This contingency becomes clear in the other above-mentioned article, published following
the Champ de Mars Massacre and bearing the ironic title of “French liberty.” The “French
liberty” in question is that of the repression and denial of natural rights ordered by the
Constituent Assembly. It is, of course, the opposite of true liberty, that of 1789. In consequence
of the loss of true liberty, that which guarantees the Declaration of Rights, France exchanged its
genuine and deserved superiority for a false preeminence, which went hand in hand with, and
based itself on, its new simulacrum of liberty. In reality, France had, for the Révolutions de Paris,
become inferior once more to the peoples of Antiquity (and to the English at the time of their
Revolution as well).46
In such a situation, where there is no longer any legitimacy to be found in a France where
the popular movement had been stifled and the Declaration of Rights flouted, the journalist turns

45
46

Ibid., pp. 447-48.
RP, t. 9, n°108, pp. 177-185. The allusions to Antiquity are on pp. 177-182.

94

to Antiquity. The universally recognized virtue of Antiquity allows the journalist to comment
ironically on the Assembly and its decrees. The article begins by invoking this example:
It used to be, that when it was a question of liberty, people cited the Greeks and
Romans with deference; sometimes they named the Franks, our forefathers, and
recently they spoke only of the English. If our old historians and college regents
are to be believed, these four peoples carried out great things only because they
had a great idea of their independence. People did not fail to recall their political
principles, they spoke the names of their great men, and they believed they had
said all that needed to be said; they imagined nothing beyond them.47
The journal invokes the authority of the “old historians” and “college regents” of the Ancien
Régime in order to show how the liberty of the Greeks and Romans, even of the Franks and the
English, were accepted by all, even by those who did not necessary have any interest in or hope
of seeing liberty take root in France. Denouncing the Assembly for violating the Declaration of
Rights remained fundamental to the journal’s discourse. However, the Declaration of Rights was
no longer an object of consensus for the deputies of the Assembly who wanted to “moderate” it.
In order to critique them against a rubric that still mattered to them, the journal has to bring in the
model of Antiquity. The “moderates” of the Assembly may have felt able to deny the validity of
the Declaration, but they were incapable of denying the legitimizing power of the example of
Antiquity.
After invoking the consensus that had reigned even under the Ancien Régime regarding
the liberty of the English, the Franks, and especially the Greeks and Romans, the journal
ironically refuses these examples. In so doing, the article highlights the disparity between the
Assembly’s policies and true liberty: “It was fine to say all that in times past and even up until 25
June 1791 [when the Assembly refused a popular referendum on the king’s fate]; but since that
time, and especially since 17 July [date of the Champ de Mars Massacre], we have left both the
Greeks and Romans and Gaul and England quite far behind us. French liberty is another thing
47
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entirely from all that.”48 The irony lies, of course, in that the French had been better than those
peoples for a time, thanks to the Declaration of Rights, trampled by recent events. France was
now relegated to the class of peoples who reject liberty after having experienced it, which is to
say to the lowest rung on the patriot hierarchy of nations.49
The rest of the article is full of these contrasts between the institutions of free peoples and
the Assembly’s decrees, such as martial law, suffrage restricted to those of property, or assaults
against freedom of the press or of assembly. One example will suffice to understand their tenor:
Really, it used to be quite agreeable to be able to have discussions in nice weather
in public squares and walkways. The people of Paris found it good, the Athenians
too, and the citizens of Rome had gotten a taste for such pastimes, and they called
that being free. But in the final analysis, to what end were all those motions
made? Sometimes people would clip the wings of the eagles of the Manège [the
hall where the Assembly met], who get lost in the clouds so as to make a golden
rain descend from them. The multitude was initiating itself in the mysteries of
legislation. It was a rather good school for the people, it cannot be dissimulated;
but a nation that sees too clearly is too much of a nuisance to its legislators. The
Assembly would have had a fine job if it had lent its ears for too long to what was
being said about it in those groups.50
In short, we, the French, we the patriots of Paris, had discovered what the Athenians and Romans
knew: that the virtue of the people, nourished and instructed in the democratic public sphere,
serves as a guarantee against the corruption of the Assembly. In the end, the peoples of Antiquity
are but avatars of a free people, which always share certain essential features, among them the
power to openly discuss acts of government. In this instance the Révolutions de Paris avoids
speaking of the contradictions of the classical example, not because they are unknown to its
contributors, but in order to better underline the eternal character of liberty and take advantage of
the effectiveness of Antiquity as a legitimizing example for patriots and their adversaries alike.

48

Ibid.
See Marc Belissa, Fraternité universelle et intérêt national (1713-1795), Les cosmopolitiques du droit des gens
(Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1998), especially pp. 398-402.
50
RP, t. 9, n°108, p. 182.
49

96

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that these characteristics of liberty that France
shares with Rome or Athens in patriot thought do not amount to a Constantian “liberty of the
Ancients.” While the right to make oneself heard in a public forum is valuable in and of itself, its
principal importance lies in its function as a guarantee of all rights. The people must keep an eye
on the Assembly precisely so that corrupt deputies do not betray them by flouting their rights.
This principle, which emerges from the afore-cited passage, is also inscribed in the
Declaration of Rights. One declares rights because: “the ignorance, forgetting or contempt for the
rights of man are the only causes of public misfortunes and the corruption of governments.”51
The Declaration is designed to recall these rights in order to prevent these ills. And who is in a
position to survey the government, Declaration of Rights in hand, if not the people?52 The
Ancients displayed conduct characteristic of liberty, but they lacked the foundations of the
philosophy of natural rights that would universalize that liberty. For patriots like the contributors
to the Révolutions de Paris, the French had a choice: they could surpass the Ancients by
conserving their rights and those of all humanity, or they could sink into a degradation which
would place them beneath the Ancients, by turning away even from the ancient conception of the
republic which protects its citizens from arbitrary power. Or, to paraphrase Bernard Groethuysen,
a people is worth what their rights are worth.53
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Conclusion
The Varennes Crisis was without a doubt one of the most important turning points of the
French Revolution, but above all it was a crisis of legitimacy for the monarchy. At that moment,
when the legitimacy of the government was widely questioned and alternatives began to be
suggested, any rhetorical or ideological tools that could legitimize those new alternatives became
a central focus of revolutionary discourse. The reference to Antiquity is one of the most
important of these tools, along with allusions to the English and American Revolutions and the
invocation of Enlightenment philosophes. In some ways it was perhaps even the most powerful
among them, for to invoke Antiquity is to draw on a culture shared by all levels of society.
This classical culture was familiar not only to élites educated in Latin rhetoric in the
collèges or by tutors, but also to the much more numerous class of people who would have been
able to read the translations of classical works which were published in ever increasing numbers
in the course of the 18th century. Even those who could not read would have had occasion to
know Antiquity through artistic or theatrical representations, the imagery of which would be
further popularized by Revolutionary festivals. Moreover this common culture was based on a
broadly consensual reading of classical referents. Because there was little disagreement about the
meaning of ancient history and mythology, references could be used as shorthand for certain
ideas. More importantly, references rarely backfired. Comparing a contemporary to Cato was
universally recognized as equivalent to calling him virtuous and Cato’s own virtue went
uncontested. Thus, widely recognized and an object of consensus, the reference to Antiquity was
doubly effective as a legitimizing tool.
The Révolutions de Paris provided numerous examples of legitimizing references to
Antiquity in the summer of 1791, appealing to this common culture. These references become all
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the more significant in light of the journal’s wide influence in patriot circles. Its contributors
reserved their rhetoric mainly for its patriot readership, and especially those among them who
remained suspicious of the republic as an alternative to monarchy. However, they also addressed
their adversaries, partisans of the restoration of the constitutional monarchy, for they recognized
the importance of combatting the influence of monarchist arguments in the wider national debate.
One should note that the Révolutions de Paris never bothered to address open adherents of the
counterrevolution in this way. As irreconcilable enemies of the Revolution and its principles, they
were beyond the reach of the journal’s arguments, which were predicated on the justice and
necessity of both. However, convincing the different currents of opinion among revolutionary
actors was already a challenging proposition. This is why the Révolutions de Paris sought to
legitimize its point of view through the use of consensual references such as those that invoke
Antiquity.
Within the framework of this legitimizing function, classical allusions had two principal
tasks to accomplish in the Révolutions de Paris during the Varennes Crisis: that of contesting the
monarchical regime established by the constitution of 1791 and its partisans, and the
complementary task of reinforcing patriot and republican ideals. In order to delegitimize the
monarchy, the journal used mostly negative allusions, drawing on Roman history to find
archetypes of tyranny and on Greco-Roman mythology, which allowed the journal to ridicule and
condemn the monarchy at the same time. In the course of its demonstration of the way in which
the constitutional monarchy trampled the people’s rights, the Révolutions de Paris directed most
of their critiques against the National Assembly. This demonstrates not only its contributors’ own
conviction that the king had abdicated by his flight and that the real locus of power was to be
found in the Assembly during the Varennes Crisis, but the underlying truth of that conviction.
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While the journal’s principal target was indeed the Assembly, references themselves
could continue to apply to either Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette or the Assembly, as when the
journal blames the Assembly for supporting a king resembling Tarquin or Caligula. Louis is
always the tyrant in these representations, even when ridiculed through mythological references,
as when the journal compares him to the god of feasts ready to devour his people. On the other
hand, references adhering to Antoinette or the Assembly are often gendered. The journal often
applies sexualized mythological references to Antoinette in particular. These gendered and
sexualized references drew on misogynistic topoi, even though the reasons for their use were
generally political. Any rhetorical tool was acceptable as long as it increased the probability of
being able to seize the opportunity provided by the Varennes Crisis to rid France of a traitorous
and corrupting monarchy.
The reference to Antiquity was, however, not only negative, but also came to the support
of republicanism in both of its definitions, that of a “free state” where natural rights are respected,
in which all patriots believed by definition, and, more controversially, that of a government
without a king. The defense of the second definition was most often implicit, presented as the
only means of defending a republic of the first description given the constitutional monarchy’s
failure to meet this expectation. The republic that the Révolutions de Paris advocated was never
the Roman Republic or what were referred to in the 18th century as the “republics” of Athens or
Sparta, because those republics knew neither natural rights philosophy nor representation. If
Antiquity provided a republican model, it was rather an abstracted model of virtue than one of
concrete institutions.
Consequently, the journal’s contributors invoke classical figures widely known for their
republican virtue rather than Greco-Roman institutions. On the few occasions when the journal
departed from this pattern, it was not using the reference in question to legitimize republicanism,
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but rather to promote a measure of a more esthetic or cultural nature, such as that regarding
funeral practices. The usefulness of the classical model remained therefore above all in its
legitimization of the revolutionary ideal through the analogy between patriots and virtuous
figures from Antiquity, or through appeals to the people to imitate that virtue. Even then, the
Révolutions de Paris modified the ancient model of virtue by putting it in service of natural
rights. This use does not imply a desire to return to Antiquity, therefore, but to adopt its best
attributes, in particular republican virtue, and to surpass it, Declaration of Rights in hand.
This idea is the same which would emerge with the Republic a year later in the journal’s
pages in its most developed and explicit form:
Therefore then, while we respect the mores of the golden age of Antiquity [la
belle antiquité], while we admire the masterpieces it left us in the fine arts,
Athens, Sparta, and Rome, as to their legislation, have nothing to offer us capable
of serving as a rule or safeguard for us […] We are the first and only ones to
found a fraternal government; may we have rivals! But we certainly have no
model, we imitate no one. […] We consult nature alone; we return to the
imprescriptible rights of man, from which we deduce those of the citizen.1
It is not a coincidence that this emphatic rejection of any model, including that of Antiquity with
all its legitimizing power, had to await the arrival of the Republic to appear in all its force, even
though the Révolutions de Paris had already revealed tendencies in this direction at the time of
the Varennes Crisis. In the battle for legitimacy raging at the time, mouthpieces of the republican
movement such as this journal still needed to draw on every legitimizing source available to
them. Among these, the Révolutions de Paris could not ignore Antiquity, with its consensual
symbols and its well-known role as the origin of the idea of the republic. However, as this thesis
has attempted to demonstrate, it was never the journal’s goal to encourage the imitation of
Antiquity, unless in esthetics, or when it came to republican virtue, although even then it was a
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question of a republican virtue adapted to serve a philosophy of natural rights unknown to the
Ancients.
This implicit rejection of Antiquity as a model to imitate, like the more explicit rejection
that the journal would elaborate a year later, force us to rethink the interpretation of Volney,
Constant or Marx and of those who followed them, of a French Revolution which cast itself
without a thought into a classical mold, and the assumption of the revolutionaries’ inconsequence
that accompanies it. The example of the Révolutions de Paris during the Varennes Crisis
demonstrates that at least some patriots and republicans knew how to make use of Antiquity
without being abused by it. It would be surprising if they were the only ones. Perhaps given this
observation, it would behoove us to no longer seek to understand revolutionary discourse as the
servile imitation of any model, but rather to begin, as some researchers are already doing, to take
revolutionary thought seriously in all its originality.
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